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I focus empirically on credit rating decisions by local offices within a prominent 19th Century 
credit rating agency, as the organization, as a whole, responded to external threats. Findings 
from this study show that the heightened accountability of reported performance feedback is 
an important factor shaping the nature of lower-level organizational response to evident 
failures in decision-making processes. Public failure, which engenders threat to the 
organization, heightens the need to justify decision-making processes at the local level.  I 
provide evidence to suggest that, at times when this need was greatest, credit-rating agents in 
local offices responded avoiding changes to previous ratings decisions, and when changes 
were made, these choices reflected greater conformity (greater reliance on decision criteria 
and standards consistent with emerging commercial norms and conventions).  Also, local 
offices made changes to the way they produced and distributed source material, changes that 
made these processes appear more conventional and information more accessible.  Together, 
these legitimacy-driven responses led to poorer quality decisions and less functional 
information.  The very different nature of credit reporting during this period points to 
systematic differences in organizational response to failure under different historical 
conditions. Moreover, it raises questions about the larger structure of decision-making in 
mediated markets, where critics and gatekeepers, like many other economic actors, are 
sensitive to public scrutiny and labor to shape their reputations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on markets and organizations reveals that the attempt to evade an 
audience and cloud its perceptions is not an uncommon phenomenon.  There certainly 
has been no dearth of research exploring the ways and conditions under which 
organizations manipulate audience cognition by distorting information.  On the edge 
of organizational theory, studies ranging from literature in marketing on persuasion 
and customer attraction (e.g., Gardner 1975) to more critical studies of fraud and 
deception (e.g., Baker and Faulkner 1993; Galbraith 2004) examine the active 
management of constituent attitudes and sensitivities through information content and 
access.  More centrally, institutional theory studies of decoupling and symbolic 
management (Pfeffer 1981; Perrow 1985; Westphal and Zajac1994 2001), as well as 
impression management studies of spokesperson intervention and “sense-giving” 
maneuvers (Sutton and Callahan 1987, Elsbach et al. 1998), tie firms’ choices of 
structures, strategies, and tactics to the need to “mask or distract attention from 
controversial activities” (Elsbach and Sutton 1992:700; see also Meyer and Rowan 
1977).   
I examine information distortion as it relates to socially-constructed reputations 
in markets (Merton 1968; Rao 1994) – reputations that depend on performance as well 
as attention to building and maintenance, which builds on previous work that 
examines legitimacy and its relationship to performance and conformity behavior 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001).  What sets this study apart, 
however, is its emphasis on the recognition of poor performance versus success.  I 
claim that a firm will engage in conformity and legitimacy-seeking behavior to mask 
poor performance, softening its impact on a firm’s reputation – even when this 
legitimacy-seeking behavior erodes performance even further.     
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In this study, I examine mid-19th century credit reporting – a time when 
professionals at a major reporting agency were addressing the inevitability of poor 
performance.  I provide evidence to show how these experts, concerned with averting 
scrutiny of an emerging reporting format, intentionally distorted published evaluations 
through shifts in evaluation criteria, manipulation of evaluation outcomes, and 
changes to the information collection and recording process.  I submit that these 
distortions were designed to fend off criticism of newly (and reluctantly)-introduced 
credit ratings, minimizing reputational damage during periods when the visibility of 
these evaluations is particularly high. 
In my setting, I observe that a credit reporting firm used distortion to avert 
controversy at two key moments: (a) at the time of the release of this new, inferior 
credit reporting format and (b) at the time of extreme public censure following the 
release.  For this firm, building and maintaining its reputation during the earliest, 
formative years of the credit reporting industry required managing the reporting 
process to help distance itself from anticipated audience challenges (e.g., media 






Because this study examines poor performance and a firm’s strategy for 
addressing it, it necessarily builds on theories of firm adaptation and learned response 
to failure.  Seminal work on the behavioral theory of the firm emphasizes the 
organizational processes of performance evaluation, search, and decision-making, 
proposing that decision-makers evaluate their performance relative to aspiration 
levels, initiating a search for alternative decision-making routines when they do not 
expect to meet these performance targets (Cyert and March 1963).  Although the study 
of performance feedback and adaptation has progressed immensely since the time of 
this foundational work, important issues remain unresolved and important questions 
remain unanswered.  It is unclear, for example, why anticipation of failure to meet 
aspiration levels, alone, is often not enough to engender an effective solution to 
productivity shortfalls.  Scholars have argued convincingly that using sociological 
perspectives of the limits to rational decision-making will provide a more complete 
understanding of the process of organizational adaptation.  Vaughan’s (1990) work on 
the Challenger disaster, for example, shows that internal culture and relationship 
structure can stand in the way of effective problem-solving, even when failure is 
imminent.  Ross and Staw (1993), in their study of the Shoreham Nuclear Power 
Plant, describe the cultural norms and political pressures that can lead to pathological 
commitment to prior courses of action.  This study helps add texture to extant research 
on failure response by drawing attention to the role of failure in influencing 
relationships within a firm and the way that failure is addressed by a firm’s internal 
units. 
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Rigidity of Response 
Organizational response to failure and poor performance has been a central 
topic of interest in organizational and decision-making theory, with much of the 
discussion centering on the tension between the motivation to change and the ability to 
break the cycle of ineffectual decision-making.  Early behavioral theory first showed 
how organizations learn from their experience by repeating apparently successful 
technical routines and abandoning unsuccessful processes (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
March 1988).  A decision-maker’s growing preference for past behavior results from 
the repetitive use of these past choices (Levitt and March 1988).  However, when 
repeated patterns lead organizations to discontinuous change (typically accompanied 
with performance loss), decision-makers engage in “problemistic” searches, 
effectively breaking the path-dependency of past choices (Nelson and Winter 1982).   
This key point – external-internal incongruence induces corrective action – is 
the foundation for a long line of research on performance-based structural change 
(e.g., Lant et al. 1992; Greve 1998) and organizational learning (Levinthal and March 
1993).  If we apply this adaptation principle to expert evaluation, we might see public 
censure as pushing expert organizations to re-evaluate decision-making processes, 
yielding changes to evaluation choices. 
Research does not, however, uniformly support the view that negative 
feedback prompts internal adjustments to routines.  From a threat-rigidity perspective 
(Staw et al. 1981), core decision-makers become less likely to react effectively or 
change direction when threat perception – a deep sense of vulnerability, loss, and lack 
of control (Dutton and Jackson 1987) – accompanies negative feedback. In particular, 
when negative feedback is perceived as a legitimacy threat – role insecurity and 
intense external scrutiny (Fox and Staw 1979) – decision-making processes will tend 
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to become more rigid and inflexible (Staw et al. 1981), constraining the range of 
action and consequently, the quality of response. 
Examples of organizations facing endogenous failure and exogenous shocks 
provide evidence that organizations are often prone to unresponsive behavior in light 
of their own shortcomings (Cameron et al. 1987; Sutton and D’Aunno 1989) and 
greater inertia in the face of environmental change (D’Aveni and MacMillan 1990).  
Both structural and psychological factors constrain choices by key decision-makers of 
the organization, it is argued, so that threat perception reduces experimentation in 
response (Ross and Staw 1993).  Structurally-speaking, the flow of information and 
patterns of control restrict the dynamic ability to explore, refocus, and implement 
technical discovery.  Top-level decision-makers share less and solicit less feedback to 
inform choices.  At the individual level, anxiety and stress brought on by threat 
conditions limit top decision-makers’ focus and attention, so that they may further 
disregard important information and narrow the range of dominant responses to the 
most structurally and cognitively routine (Staw et al. 1981).  In sum, failure perceived 
as a serious threat leads key decision-makers to resist change, adopting only the most 
comfortable, easy-to-access solutions to performance shortfalls.   
In this way, core decision-makers are often just running faster in the same 
direction in response to crises.  As the saying goes in tennis instruction, they simply 
“run around the backhand.”  That is, they favor a more comfortable, dominant move, 
to the point of aggressively avoiding a more effective, well-rounded game.  Counter-
intuitively, motivation to change under conditions of threat perception constrains 
rather than enables a dynamic range of action (Prahalad and Bettis 1986; Ocasio 
1998).  Support for this idea can be found in research ranging from employee behavior 
during decline (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetton 1988) to organizational creativity 
during downsizing (Amabile and Conti 1999).  We can conclude from this work that 
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organizational work environments characterized by sudden instability and negativity 
or even the mere anticipation of such a climate can dampen the dynamic nature and 
utility of the thought process.   Loss of an organization’s cognitive capacity bounds a 
firm’s rationality (March and Simon 1958), though decision-makers are prompted to 
improve it.   
Politically -Motivated Decision-Making 
Though the rigidity of organizational decision-making clearly affects the 
nature and quality of choices, it does not necessarily follow that decision-making is 
suboptimal because of the attachment to the routine and familiar.  Decision-making 
might also be suboptimal because the motivation to impress trumps the motivation to 
improve.  The rigidity perspective argues that change is limited to a narrow set of 
dominant responses, but what are these dominant responses?  Must they be internal 
routines learned through experience?  Ocasio (1998) argues that this does not have to 
be the case.  As institutional theorists have long noted, actors can vicariously learn or 
mimic decision-making rules and conventions used by other organizations, employing 
these conventions to gain legitimacy (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983). To examine 
this phenomenon more closely, I discuss various decision-making models that may 
apply, closing by suggesting that accountability pressure accompanying public failure 
provides a context where this kind of political action is especially likely. 
There are different ways researchers in the social sciences model decision 
making, many of which can be grouped according to the relative importance 
researchers place on the model of human thought, the limits of their capabilities, and 
the locus of decision-making goals more broadly.   
Many researchers emphasize the way that judgment and choice function to 
appraise reality and maximize utility.  This rational actor approach assumes that actors 
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are inherently self-interested, seek clarity, and take the most direct, efficient action to 
pursue their goals (Williamson 1979; Elster 1996).  Actors are imagined as instinctive 
scientists, seeking to effectively process information to make sense of the world and 
use what they gather to rigorously appraise a variety of social situations (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991).  When confronted with a set of circumstances, they resourcefully 
process information, make well-informed inferences, and use these conclusions to 
make sound predictions about possible future outcomes.  Actors are also thought of as 
amateur economists, navigating their situations by assessing these outcomes in light of 
instrumental goals and then choosing a course of action that most efficiently and 
effectively advances their individual interests (Kagel and Roth 1995).  In short, a 
purposeful and analytic actor is driven to make a rational choice − to deliberately 
choose from among alternatives based on expected consequences.  This functional 
model of decision making is appealing, as it is powerfully predictive and elegant in its 
simplicity.  Researchers only need to assume a set of preferences and expected 
outcomes to model large-scale behavior based on marginal returns on competing 
investments.  Critics have cautioned that the scope of this model is limited; core 
assumptions fall flat when attempting to model individual judgment and choice where 
decision making ability is limited.   
An alternate model attempts to address a lack of realism in the model.  The 
bounded-rationality model views decision making in a more cognitively plausible 
way, assuming that individuals have neither the time nor the resources to pursue all of 
the information that they need to make perfectly rational decisions (March and Simon 
1958).  Decision-makers attempt to effectively appraise current reality and maximize 
future utility, but their ability to reason is handicapped when they confront these 
limitations.  The bounded rationality model allows departures from rationality. Under 
conditions of environmental uncertainty and complexity, people often resort to 
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“satisficing” or looking for a course of action that is simply satisfactory, for example.  
They also activate cognitive biases − subjective opinions operating below the level of 
consciousness that reduce the complexity of decision-making (Kahneman et al. 1982).  
These departures, while not purely rational, are functional in their own right.  
However flawed, a person’s eventual judgment and choices derive from these 
shortcuts that serve to make decision-making more efficient (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974).  As Elster (1996) suggests, “When faced with several courses of action, people 
usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome” (p. 22).  The 
eventual outcome, however, is often one that neither makes the most sense of the 
situation nor maximizes utility. By positing people as intendedly rational − that is, 
people are forward looking, but limited in their ability to process information in order 
to effectively predict outcomes – this approach preserves the idea that awareness and 
reason underlies decision-making, while more credibly modeling judgment and 
choice.   
The rational actor and bounded rationality models cast decision making as a 
fundamentally forward-looking process.  Actors seek the best cognitive representation 
of the situation and attempt to use this newfound cognitive mastery (or best possible 
appraisal) to effectively predict and choose among future outcomes.  March and Olsen 
(1989) suggest that these functional models might not capture the way that many 
decision makers actually make up their minds.  These accounts fail to consider 
personal history and past experience, which bear heavily on the choices actors make.  
As Ronald Coase (1998) suggests, these accounts can be likened to the study of "the 
circulation of the blood without a body" (p. 73).  A second class of models is grounded 
in convention and assumes that decision makers make choices based on pre-
determined scripts or norms.  These adaptive actors are essentially backward looking, 
looking into the mirror of the past rather than into the shadow of the future.   
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The first of these models, the experiential learning model, assumes that people 
are aware of their cognitive limits and choose actions close to past actions to reduce 
the risk of poor execution. Decision making evolves in a relatively unpredictable 
manner as actors avoid and correct mistakes by making a sequence of incremental 
changes rather than evaluating all alternatives and selecting one.  For decades, actors 
and the groups they belong to have been characterized through history-dependent 
models as being incrementally adaptive to past experience (March and Simon 1958, 
Cyert and March 1963).  Even with clear goals in mind, however, learning from one’s 
own experience is notoriously difficult (Levitt and March 1988, Levinthal and March 
1993). An individual may be unable to effectively reach goals due to a lack of 
personal experience, or because of an abundance of experience, but is influenced by 
the inertia of that experience to make suboptimal decisions.  A phenomenon known as 
the learning curve, for example, shows that as actors gain experience executing a 
certain task, their execution cost or time decreases, though at a decreasing rate.  They 
eventually reach a point of diminishing returns where repetition ceases to provide 
marginal returns.  At the same time, it burdens them with the weight of switching 
costs.  
Related to the experiential learning model is the vicarious learning model.  
This approach assumes that, when effective procedures fail to arise from an actor’s 
own experience, he mirrors the behavior of others (March 1991). Vicarious learning 
comes from observing and consulting with other individuals and groups in a social 
system.  Weber’s (1922) theory of bureaucracy contains traces of this approach, with 
its emphasis on the role of routines in formal organizations in reducing uncertainty and 
providing guidance to individuals confronted by recurring demands.  Simon (1997) 
similarly describes the purpose of the formal collective, which places “the 
organization members in a psychological environment that will adapt their decisions to 
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the organization objectives, and will provide them with the information needed to 
make these decisions correctly” (p. 92).  As with experiential learning, however, when 
actors decide to do what was done in the past, they choose a course of action that may 
or may not have the highest payoff.  When people decide on courses of action that 
have worked for others in the past, they reduce the cognitive demands of decision 
making, yet increase the risk of not maximizing utility by failing to sufficiently reason 
through future consequences of alternatives.  In this case, the value of others’ 
experience depends on comparability. Influence is more effective when others’ 
circumstances are more similar (March 1991).   
Another alternative to forward-looking models – a rule-based model − suggests 
that conventional behavior might come from conviction, rather than repetition.  This 
model assumes that actors operate within the boundaries of principles and values.  
Departures from rational behavior are due to a shift in logic from quantitative utility 
calculation to a more qualitatively focused assessment of appropriateness grounded in 
moral conviction.  Through group affiliation (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and exposure to 
wider cultural institutions (Friedland and Alford 1991), people develop a set of beliefs 
about themselves and orientations toward action and evaluation. These orientations 
lead to ritualistic behaviors that supplant more forward-looking instrumental behavior 
(DiMaggio 1997).  As with learning models, this rule-based model relaxes the 
informational and deliberative capability needs of forward-looking rational actor 
models, making it a more cognitively plausible representation of actual decision 
making in various social contexts.  One key feature of this model is that it is most 
useful in contexts where identity and logics are most salient.  Swidler (1986) argues, 
for example, that ideologies and cultural codes are most influential as guides under 
conditions of uncertainty.  Another key feature of this model is that its predictive 
power is closely tied to the trajectory of the conventions that drive behavior.  As Macy 
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and Flache (1995) suggest, the analytic focus of such a model shifts “from the calculus 
of marginal utility … towards the evolution of hard-wired cultural codes, including 
pragmatic or heuristic routines, social conventions, institutionalized rituals, moral 
habits, and normative rules.”  Failure to track the changing basis of values and beliefs 
limits the usefulness of this rule-based model. 
While the aforementioned models vary in terms of their assumptions about the 
nature of human thought and the capability of human cognition, they all depict 
decision making as an instrumental process serving immediate goals.  A final 
approach depicts decision makers as political actors, seeking to gain legitimacy and 
maintain good relations with others, often sacrificing goals that fit their own personal 
agenda.  This political decision making model views the adoption of practices as either 
a gesture of solidarity (Meyer and Rowan 1977) or as a way to pursue a course of 
action that is most readily justifiable (Tetlock 1992).  In many complex, socially 
embedded contexts (Granovetter 1985), the public expects that actors will assume 
broader societal roles or operate within the boundaries of predetermined norms, even 
when actors do not embrace these norms as part of their personal belief system 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1987).  Here, instinctive scientists and amateur 
economists adopt a practice to appear in conformance with norms, rather than pursue 
their own self-interest in a more immediate, straightforward way (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Zucker 1987).    
Impression-Motivated Response 
This political decision-making model informs a large body of research 
attending to the relationship between firm performance and the firm’s attempt to gain 
social recognition for the quality of its goods and services.  Research shows, for 
example, that actors can enhance their own image through strong endorsements and 
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public recognition by highly-regarded others, such as the press, credentialing 
organizations, trade associations, and regulatory institutions (Ruef and Scott 1998; 
Jensen and Roy 2008).  Well-publicized boosts in credibility act as a form of 
validation (Rao 1994), even in cases where they do not necessarily provide new 
information about the firm (Rindova et al. 2005; Anderson and Shirako 2008).  As 
news of public endorsement circulates, a firm’s legitimacy grows, strengthening the 
generalized belief of a firm’s quality (Barney 1991; Hall 1992; Deephouse and 
Suchman 2008), making stakeholders feel more secure in building relationships, and 
helping customers feel more comfortable paying a premium for services rendered 
(Merton 1968; Bromley 1993; Fombrun 1996).  When the spotlight is turned on poor 
performance, it has the similar effect of sharpening the impact of such performance on 
reputation.  If it persists, such attention will likely overshadow past success and its 
impact on performance, eroding any residual perceptions of quality (King and Pearce 
2010).   
Response Behavior 
Being singled out for poor performance can be an effective mechanism for 
triggering a problemistic search – a search for strategies to restore an audience’s 
comfort and confidence.  As Zajac and Westphal (1994) suggest, negative signals of 
quality from external audiences can grab a scrutinized firm’s attention, prompting 
immediate corrective action.  While motivated to take action, a high-visibility, low-
performing firm quickly faces factors that limit the range of corrective action.  For one 
thing, it lacks the time to improve its reputation with sustained, improved 
performance.  Without the opportunity to provide admissible evidence of reliability 
and competence, the firm bears the immediate burden of providing others clues to 
guide expectations.  With an elevated sense of urgency to “fill the void” with this 
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evidence, the short time that it has to mend fences is typically not spent properly 
searching for a performance improvement solution to effectively assuage its critics 
(Staw et al. 1981; Suchman 1995).   
Rather, the immediate focus typically shifts from improving technical 
processes to managing the perception that the firm itself is sound (Perrow 1984; 
Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).  For most decision-makers, the attention that public failure 
draws engenders the felt need to justify behavior to others, and this accountability 
pressure shifts the firm’s focus from the effectiveness of choice processes and routines 
to its social acceptability (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  This political motive determines 
the choice of corrective action for the firm, which often includes matching the 
specific, known preferences its audience (Tetlock 1983).  Even if audience preferences 
are unknown, the firm might choose a course of action that is more in line with the 
cultural norms and conventions persisting in the wider public (Meyer and Rowan 
1978; Swidler 1986).  Such symbolic gestures serve to defend legitimacy 
expeditiously, even when such action has no real impact on performance (Boeker 
1992; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004).  In effect, this 
behavior creates an immediate “firewall” of sorts between past censure and ongoing 
capability-building (Suchman 1995). 
A caveat here is that the high-visibility, low-performing firm might have more 
success with some gestures than with others.  Any strong, self-promotion tactic 
following negative publicity may be hazardous, for it would probably be viewed as 
forced, superficial, or manipulative (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).  Rather than actively 
broadcasting a counter-message from a tainted source, a censured organization would 
be more likely to influence public opinion by minimizing the extant negative message.  
Suchman (1995) calls this attempt to lower a firm’s visibility a “normalizing” strategy, 
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which is, in a sense, fighting fire with fire; a firm can take steps to minimize its 
signature, thereby dampening the effect of failure on its reputation.  
Anticipatory Strategies 
Firms that anticipate failure, rather than those facing past transgressions, are at 
a distinct advantage here.   If a firm expects to deal with scrutiny, it can pursue a 
normalizing strategy that preemptively controls news before it reaches the public 
(Elsbach et al. 1998).  That is, it can try to prevent the social construction of an 
unfavorable reputation – fighting fire with fire before the opposing flame is lit, so to 
speak.  Even in cases where the likelihood of a scrutiny-inducing event is uncertain, 
awareness of the possibility of failure is shown to have made firms more likely to try 
to manage their audience’s attention in a way that reduces the likelihood of any strong 
impression being made (Suchman 1995; Elsbach et al. 1998; Graffin et al. 2009; Desai 
2011).  For example, Elsbach et al. (1998) show how hospitals avert audience 
challenges to hospital bills by redirecting their attention or overwhelming them with 
positive or negative images orthogonal to the charges themselves.  Graffin, Carpenter, 
and Boivi (2011) argue that to minimize direct scrutiny of an event, firms can 
coordinate a “noisy” release of information about the event (p. 749).  Here, the firm 
floods the public with multiple, simultaneous pieces of relevant information, so that 
any first, anchoring impressions are difficult to make.  In these ways, organizations 
expecting criticism avoid drawing attention to future, potentially disruptive events by 
distracting and overwhelming audience attention (Elsbach et al. 1998).  
Rather than flooding potential critics with relevant information, reducing an 
audience’s ability to process these cues, they might also take a more minimalist 
approach.  That is, rather than overloading processing, they might avoid stimulating 
this processing in the first place.   
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Ratings Distortion 
External Assessment Criteria 
The earliest work in institutional theory suggests that firms can reduce their 
signature, masking or distracting attention from controversial core routines, without 
aggressive self-promotion by adopting structures that conform to institutional norms 
and then decoupling these structures from unacceptable processes.  Research provides 
some proof that illegitimate, atypical firms attract attention to themselves in a bad way 
(Elsbach and Sutton 1992; Hsu and Hannan 2005).  It follows, then that, rather than 
adopting legitimate practices and structures to amplify their successes (Rao 1994), 
they might do so to avoid attention, averting a socially constructed, negative 
reputation.   
Like the aforementioned impression management techniques, this approach 
involves activities that can be thought of as collateral or window-dressing activities – 
peripheral to core, day-to-day routines.  However, firms can also carry out 
controversial core activities without unwanted attention by using legitimate, socially-
endorsed procedures to execute these activities (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987).  
Citing econometric procedures as an example, Meyer and Rowan (1977) propose that 
having conventional practices in place ahead of poor performance helps to justify the 
decisions made that lead to failure, thereby avoiding controversy.   
As previously mentioned, lines of research in institutional theory and 
impression management explore themes consistent with extant research in social 
psychology on accountability.  The accountability perspective depicts decision makers 
as political actors, seeking to maintain good relations with others and pursuing courses 
of action that are most readily justifiable when subject to heightened levels of scrutiny 
(Lerner and Tetlock 1999).  When actors know the preferences of their audience, they 
are more likely to shift their own decision-making to align themselves with this 
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audience.  For example, if decision-makers know their superior is a Democrat, they 
will likely select “Democrat” when asked to state their political affiliation (Tetlock 
1983).  Even when these specific preferences are not known, the actor may favor a 
commonly-known convention or appeal to a universal logic.  Just as early research in 
institutional theory proposes, the actor may adopt external assessment criteria to 
demonstrate to a wider audience “that procedures were prudent and decisions were 
made by rational means” (Meyer and Rowan 1977:350). 
When controversial decisions are part of a firm’s ongoing routines, these 
adopted criteria should be a rather persistent part of a firm’s decision-making 
processes.  However, firms should be especially motivated to adopt such a tactic 
should there be a time when it anticipates heightened accountability.  It is reasonable 
to expect that credit-reporting professionals engage in anticipatory tactics such as this 
one as a way to protect themselves from negative reactions to ongoing ratings 
assignments, especially when they anticipate greater attention drawn to their ratings.   
I should note that this tactic should also be desirable when decision-makers make 
choices under the heightened scrutiny of conflicting constituencies.  Appealing to a 
universal logic is less controversial than adopting a specific preference when that 
preference is not shared among all stakeholders.  
Stability 
Accountability research suggests that when decision-makers make choices 
under the heightened scrutiny of conflicting constituencies, they are also likely to 
engage in evasive, decision-avoidance strategies.  Simply passing the buck or 
procrastinating helps the actor avoid entirely the “stress of alienating one of the two 
(or more) disagreeing constituencies,” which in turn causes friction and attracts 
unwanted attention from critical audiences (Green et al. 2000).   
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Legal scholars in the U.S. find that judges are often motivated by these kinds 
of accountability concerns when making choices, even when these choices clash with 
their personal ideological loyalties or the perceived “correctness” of a decision (see 
Posner 2008 for review).  They argue that judicial decision-making is effectively 
explained by a combination of various models, to include a strategic framework that 
highlights judges’ concerns with the reaction of other actors outside the judicial 
system to their rulings (Eskridge 1993; Robbennolt et al. 2008).  Supreme Court 
justices, for example, are constrained by “an awareness, conscious or unconscious, 
that they cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting reprisals by the other branches of 
government spurred on by an indignant public” (Posner 2008:375).  Decisions are 
often stalled or postponed to prevent subsequent legislative reversal (Eskridge 1993), 
and the Court is likely to avoid politically difficult decisions by denying “petition for 
writ certiorari” – a formal request to review a lower court’s ruling (Epstein and Knight 
1998).  Concerned with opening the “floodgates of litigation” (Margolis 2001) – a 
flurry of responses, likely to erode political capital and overwhelm the efficient use of 
judicial time and resources – judges tend to avoid the most controversial, attention-
grabbing rulings.  And despite conventional wisdom that judges use their posts to push 
their personal agendas, legal scholars maintain that most high-level judges are inclined 
to keep a low profile, embracing mainstream points of view and embracing stare 
decisis to the point where even a demonstration of error is often not enough to justify 
overruling past decisions (e.g., Monaghan 1988; Fried 1994; Hellman 1995).   
In the context of credit-rating assignment, agents are similarly concerned with 
avoiding attention in the face of scrutiny.  Changes to appraisal scores are the most 
likely way to attract attention among credit-rating stakeholders.  In the same way that 
judicial overruling disrupts public policy and invites protestation (Posner 1996), 
ratings volatility prompts contract renegotiation and pricing adjustment while 
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redirecting attention to previously taken-for-granted risk assessments due to the 
alienation of key audience members, which, of course, makes the ratings professionals 
themselves more visible actors in the web of credit and investment activity.  It is 
expected, then, that these experts will maintain consistency by minimizing or delaying 
period-to-period changes to their ratings following negative publicity – a time when 
accountability pressure is especially strong.  That is, they will rely more heavily on 
past appraisals in the assignment of ratings to preemptively avoid a growing silhouette 







 CENTURY CREDIT RATING 
Preliminary Investigation 
My interest in anticipatory tactics taken by Dun was sparked by historical 
accounts I came across, which described public complaints from both its customers 
(“subscribers”) and its evaluated firms. Taking issue with Dun’s reports, these 
complaints suggested that information was often inaccurate or prejudiced (e.g., 
Meagher, 1876).  There was certainly no dearth of praise for Dun during the 19th 
Century, as the agency provided a vital function for many (Hunt, 1851).  In fact, 
during the formative years of the credit reporting industry, Dun grew in scope and 
standing to become the premier credit reporting agency of the 19th century.  The 
strength of the agency’s reputation was tested, nonetheless.  The least hostile of critics 
found that information produced by Dun was, at times, blurry and ambiguous.  The 
most severe believed that information was outdated, misleading, and often slanderous.  
Litigation and criticism against Dun (and all credit agencies) appeared in the ante-
bellum period and then surged through the 1870s (Oligario 2006).  This created a 
climate of natural suspicion, where any release of credit information was potentially a 
negative event, compelling Dun to be on the defensive.   
Preliminary reading revealed that Dun was particularly concerned with the 
critical attention its summary ratings generated.  Growing competition among 
incumbent and upstart agencies, together with emerging market demand, forced Dun 
to reluctantly introduce this format, after it had spent decades building internal 
infrastructure and processes around written ledger reports.  Aware that the demands 
required to produce high quality summary ratings exceeded its capacity, it was sure 
that expansion into this area would invite a great deal of the aforementioned criticism 
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(Lauer 2008; Cohen 2012).  Consequently, it set out to influence the public’s 
perception and shape its image in order to avoid scrutiny.  Proactive impression 
management tactics included informational and public relations campaigns to offset 
critiques and exposés about rating (Cohen 2012).  For example, it published 
testimonial letters in its defense – selected articles and letters from subscribers that 
both vouched for the accuracy of ratings and praised the firm, more generally, for its 
contributions to commercial development (e.g., Dun, Barlow and Co., 1873, as cited in 
Cohen 2012:532).  As Cohen (2012) highlights, Dun was even willing to concede 
ground as an expert in order to avert scrutiny.  In the preface of the ratings books, it 
issued disclaimers, which rejected responsibility for the way the information contained 
in the books was used. This “buyer beware” stamp suggested that the firm was willing 
to sacrifice the functional value of its product in exchange for the safety it needed 
during this period of heightened scrutiny.  
If Dun was willing to undercut the utility of the ratings format to protect its 
reputation, then it may have purposely distorted ratings themselves to do the same.  
The aforementioned tactics used to form positive images of credibility and fairness 
were carried out through direct communication with stakeholders, given the efficacy 
of more subtle, anticipatory tactics.   
These preliminary developments encouraged me to further explore the 
introduction of ratings in the mid-19
th
 century credit rating industry as a context for 
developing a better understanding of how a firm responds to failure when its 
reputation is at stake.  I propose that Dun used expert information and decision-
making to attempt to cloud and evade an audience, preventing the social construction 
of a negative reputation.  
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Research Setting 
The emergence of credit-rating agencies in the 19
th
 century represents one of 
the earliest attempts to solve a growing information asymmetry problem in the market 
for commercial credit. With the improvement of transportation and communications 
technology during this period, the ability to conduct trade beyond local networks 
grew.  Local exchange partners could get by with easily-gathered local information 
and informal credit assessments.  However, as chains of commercial credit expanded, 
business owners needed credit reporting intermediaries with agents in the field to 
inspect and appraise distant merchants (Norris 1978). Located in offices all across the 
country, these credit-rating agencies supplied much-needed summary surveillance 
information to eager merchants for purposes of trade finance and investment.  That is, 
these agents provided information to merchants concerned with the likelihood that a 
trading partner will default (fail to meet a debt obligation). These experts played an 
especially important role in emerging U.S. geographic markets.  Powerful merchants 
in Northeastern cities were rapidly expanding their trade networks in the Western 
United States and in the South.  Here, information asymmetry was especially acute, 
due to geographic distance, cultural differences, and scarcity of personal ties 
(Carruthers and Cohen 2006; Oligario 2006). 
The Mercantile Agency was one of the early credit reporting pioneers.  
Founded by Lewis Tappan in 1841 and then later managed by Robert Graham Dun in 
the mid-1850’s, the RG Dun Mercantile Agency (Dun) sent out its cadre of local 
agents to provide appraisals of the creditworthiness of would-be borrowers. Through 
direct experience, word of mouth, and letters of recommendation, all methods used 
previously by merchants in local transactions, this vast network of reporters allowed 
trading partners to assess large numbers of entrepreneurs in distant markets. As noted 
by the agency some time later, “the local agent . . . having his eye upon every trader of 
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importance in his county, and noting it down as it occurs, every circumstance affecting 
his credit, favorably or unfavorably, becomes better acquainted with his actual 
condition than any stranger can be” (Norris 1978). 
Ledger Reports 
Reports from Dun correspondents were transcribed into large collections of 
ledgers at local branch offices, copies of which made it into the central volumes in the 
main New York office.  Ledger entries contained the proprietor’s name, line of 
business, and street address at the beginning. Shorthand and abbreviated language 
were used to conserve space, and all text was written in a 19th-century calligraphy 
style. Information on each business was contained in a single entry – a continuously- 
running paragraph with updates.  Each update was preceded by the date of the update 
and a code number or initials (to ensure anonymity) designating the source of the 
report. Within the entries, key pieces of information were contained, such as assets, 
tenure, past experience, and character, all of which painted a picture of the commercial 
standing or local reputation of the business and its owners. This information was not 
always balanced.  Findings about a person’s experience or past history of success or 
failure may not have been fully available, in which case additional information about 
an individual’s work habits or payment history may have been listed to compensate.   
Copies of ledger entry updates in the local branch offices were sent to New 
York by mail, except in cases of “serious embarrassments, assignments, and failures”, 
news of which was immediately telegraphed (Banker’s Magazine and Statistical 
Register 1858).  Subscribers – largely importers, manufacturers, and other firms 
shipping product to local retailers – were encouraged to visit the main office or their 
closest Dun branch office (a Boston business could visit the Boston office, which 
would then send a request to the main New York office for information on a business 
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in New Orleans) where they were read details from these updates and had the 
opportunity to discuss the firm and its history, more generally, with a Dun 
professional.
1
  Code numbers for subscribers or (when subscribers were outside of the 
New York area) for their branch offices were recorded in the ledgers as inquiries 
arrived.    
Credit reporting firms such as Dun’s Mercantile Agency were in a unique 
position to solve problems of information asymmetry caused by nationwide shifts in 
the nature of trade.  The credit reporting process was not safe from criticism, however.  
Narratives found in the ledgers commonly left risk assessments open to a wide variety 
of interpretations.  Assessments were blurry and ambiguous at times, especially in 
cases where information was hard to come by, and in its worst light, the Agency was 
accused as having reports marred by prejudice. The vast majority of this criticism 
came from firms that were being evaluated.
2
  Inaccuracies and biases, in the form of 
errors and omissions, could permanently handicap a firm, once on paper.  To be fair, 
entrepreneurial activity in the 19th Century was fraught with uncertainty and risk, and 
even firms with the greatest potential ended up failing and defaulting on credit 
arrangements.  Local knowledge was difficult to convey under these circumstances, 
and crafting the most careful, deliberate, and unbiased report must have been a 
challenge. Given several of the high-profile correspondents who worked for the 
Agency at one time or another (e.g., future presidents Arthur, Cleveland, McKinley, 
and Lincoln), one could imagine that every effort was made to craft such a report 
                                                          
1
 While the nature of this interaction left the subscriber without a tactile record to share with the 
community, information from these meetings routinely leaked to the public.  While there was no legal 
protection of this information until the 1870’s, making Dun’s ledger information proprietary, it was 
Dun’s (loosely regarded) policy to keep this information confidential.  Still, a vast number of libel cases 
were brought to court by evaluated firms exposed to leaked information about them.   
2
 See Scott Sandage’s Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA, 2005) for an 
excellent account of the legal fight between rated firms and The Mercantile Agency. 
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(Vose 1916). Even so, this kind of objectification of commercial reputation and its 
formalization in the written ledgers was rejected by many during the mid-19
th
 century 
as a matter of principle and, more practically, as a property breach (Atherton 1946; 
Sandage 2005; Oligario 2006).
3
  
Under the shadow of this ante-bellum debate, Dun prospered.  By the late 
1850s, Dun had enjoyed a 15-year period of rapid growth and had become the most 
prominent agency of its time.  Branch offices were located in over a dozen cities in the 
U.S., Canada, and the U.K., with subscribers in the New York office alone numbering 
close to 1,200.  Despite normative resistance to credit reporting by evaluated firms and 
the ongoing legal fight over the proprietary nature of ledger information, credit 
reporting had gained wide acceptance within the community of merchants that was 
growing, itself, in need of the assessments provided by Dun and its competitors 
(Norris 1978), as well as an effective monitor to restrict risky businesses from credit 
arrangements. 
Yet, post-bellum success brought with it a new set of problems.  Drawing on 
theories of industry evolution and stages in competition and legitimacy-building 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Barnett and Hansen 1996; Barnett and Sorensen 2002), I 
describe how Dun’s competitive situation was changed during this period and how this 
change related to the emergence of summary ratings and accompanying reputational 
challenges.  
Introduction of Ratings 
Research in organizational theory recognizes that an upstart organization in an 
emerging industry is vulnerable to a particular kind of “newness” liability (Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994).  On top of technical handicaps, such as poor internal coordination and 
                                                          
3
 See Viviana Zelizer’s Morals and the Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United 
States (New York, 1979) for a similar public and legal debate over 19
th
 century financial objectification. 
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inexperience (Stinchcombe 1965), it suffers from an initial lack of legitimacy.  That is, 
the new organization must convince suppliers, consumers, and other important 
stakeholders that its products or services – its industry-specific function in the market 
– is valued and appropriate (Suchman 1995).  In an industry that is growing and 
gaining exposure, the firm’s role is more familiar to the public and its function is 
woven more tightly into the fabric of the market (Hannan and Freeman 1986).  More 
established industries are also more commonly endorsed and publicly recognized by 
others, such as the press, credentialing organizations, trade associations, and 
regulatory institutions.  This provides entrants a level of normative credibility and 
validation that new industries cannot offer (Ruef and Scott 1998; Jensen and Roy 
2008).   
While new firms benefit from an industry’s maturation, incumbent firms  those 
that have successfully promoted new industry development – risk facing a set of 
legitimacy problems distinct from the liability of newness.  Such was the case for Dun 
during the post-bellum period.  During these years, the credit reporting industry 
transitioned from early-stage to adolescence.  Though vocal stakeholders still 
contested the quality of credit reports, the industry gained a foothold, roles became 
established, subscribers and appraised firms began to trust and understand the 
agencies, and reporting processes – the chief interaction between incumbents such as 
Dun and these stakeholders – began to become taken-for-granted and more easily 
reproduced by newcomers (Norris 1978, Oligario 2006).   
The cost to enter the credit reporting industry thus dropped, leading to 
heightened competition and crowding therein (Hannan and Freeman 1986).  Simply 
put, as agencies improved their collective social standing among constituents, 
incumbents, such as Dun, risked losing their individual competitive positions to 
newcomers.  Consistent with the Red Queen theory (Barnett and Hansen 1996; Barnett 
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and Sorensen 2002), this triggered an arms race of sorts, where Dun felt pressure to 
adopt a new, potentially disruptive technology to compete with these entrants
4
.  
Though Dun had survived a history of early-stage competition, it was not well-adapted 
to such change, constrained by the inertia of its existing processes and the growing 
cost of controlling and distributing information across its expansive network of branch 
offices (Lauer 2008; Cohen 2012).   
With the cost of expansion beyond a firm’s core processes comes a growing 
need to deal with reputational fallout associated with poor performance (Greenwood, 
Li, and Deephouse 2005). When a firm’s capability is compromised, it has the added 
burden of defending its reputation, limiting its exposure, not heightening it, as in its 
formative years (Sutton and Galunic 1996; Suchman 1995).  Before examining how 
Dun tried to protect its reputation at this time, I discuss the aforementioned disruptive 
technology – summary ratings. 
Ratings 
In 1857, J.M. Bradstreet and Son was the first credit-reporting industry 
incumbent to expand beyond its primary, ledger-based reporting format, issuing 
summary ratings in book form.  By this time, credit-reporting agencies had been 
around for a little over 20 years.
5
  Subscribers had limited exposure to ratings before 
this time, but it wasn’t until the years just prior to and just following the Civil War that 
                                                          
4
 This type of self-accelerating process, where perpetual adaptation is needed in order for a firm to 
maintain its relative fitness among competitors, was first identified in evolutionary biology by Van 
Valen (1973).  It references the Red Queen's race in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass, where 
the Red Queen and Alice are constantly running, yet remaining in the same place.  "Well, in our 
country," said Alice, still panting a little, "you'd generally get to somewhere else — if you run very fast 
for a long time, as we've been doing." ... "A slow sort of country!" said the Queen. "Now, here, you see, 
it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you 
must run at least twice as fast as that!"  
5
 Griffen, Cleaveland, and Campbell started in 1835, followed by Dun (then called the Mercantile 
Agency) in 1841 and Bradstreet between 1849 and 1850.   
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ratings books were fully introduced.  As Cohen (2012) describes, the introduction of 
summary ratings was accompanied by a large, industry-wide advertising and public 
relations campaign to promote this new format.  This increased the public’s exposure 
to ratings
6
 and their accompanying ledger material, warts and all.  It follows that 
concerns with self-presentation were heightened due to the increased public exposure 
to the performance shortfalls associated with these formats.   
Subscribers were at first intrigued with the ratings books containing summary 
ratings – advertised as rationalized summaries of the ledgers.  As the preface to Dun’s 
inaugural Reference Book of ratings states, ratings were “based upon the historical 
facts upon our records, often running back eighteen years, regarding the business 
training, the moral and business fitness, the capital, the nature, extent, and hazards of 
business...” (Mercantile Agency 1859).7  In an effort to provide a low-cost, credible 
set of records to the public, Dun categorically ranked both the capital of firms
8
 and 
their credit standing (weighted in favor of capital) in two summary measures assigned 
to each enterprise.  Credit appraisal information in this format was easily more 
accessible to subscribers, who otherwise incurred significant time and travel costs to 
visit branch offices where ledgers were presented.  The process of simplifying 
appraisal information and making the often vague, verbose, and subjective language of 
the ledgers more quantifiable also gave credit reporting a more rational and objective 
appearance – the sense that evaluators had a clear standard when assigning scores.9  
Some subscribers also benefitted from having lists of rated firms at their fingertips.  
                                                          
6
 As Cohen (2012) points out, ratings became a key component in the public face of the agency. 
7
 Two more reference books (1860-61) were published before the Civil War.  Ratings resumed in 1864. 
8
 The inclusion of assets level or pecuniary strength” categories was a first in the industry, introduced in 
the 1864 book. 
9
 As the locus of credit authority shift from credit ledgers to credit scores, even the credit ledgers 
themselves (which remained in the background as justification for the credit scores) qualitatively 
changed to meet these demands, taking on a more structured, mechanical tone.. 
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For example, large merchants and manufacturers could get a more complete view of 
the firms in a particular industry or in a specific geographic location.  Aside from 
having this kind of access to information about others, subscribers benefitted from 
having easy access to their own ratings, getting a sense for the way evaluators 
perceived them.  Also, as Cohen (2012) points out, interfacing with a Reference Book 
rather than an office professional gave the subscribers some degree of anonymity (p. 
405).  They could check ratings without revealing to the agency anything about their 
own trading activity, current or intended exchange partners, etc.    
Despite having benefits that made them attractive to subscribers, this ratings 
format introduced a number of problems that affected the reporting process.  For one 
thing, when information is compressed to form ratings, the appraisal of credit risk is 
stripped of its detail and context.  Relying on ratings, subscribers were potentially 
trading clarity for ease of access.  Additionally, as Cohen (2012) describes, numerous 
organizational and environmental processes behind the scenes likely affected the 
degree to which a score reflected the underlying fitness of a firm.  Examples included 
the state of internal communication, variation in the level of oversight exercised, and a 
shifting emphasis on the kinds of information favored in the assignment process.   
Not only were there limits to the utility of summary ratings, there were limits 
to how much Dun could control this information.  Once ratings were placed in 
subscribers hands (ledger reports were left at the branch offices), subscribers could 
share information with be shared with others, taking away a significant revenue 
opportunity.  Similarly, there was a risk of ratings being copied by other agencies, 
especially upstart agencies with no reporter network of their own.
10
  The cost to 
control this kind of information was reflected in the felt need to monitor subscribers, 
but it was also reflected in the rising cost of litigation.  The more ratings information 
                                                          
10
 See Cohen (2012: 406) for instances of interagency ratings theft. 
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spread, the more likely it reached an evaluated firm that disagreed with the scores.  
Similarly, the cost of keeping the information up to date rose.  When subscribers 
requested ledger information, Dun professionals could delay them long enough to give 
a reporter time to submit an update (Cohen 2012).
11
  Without that level of control over 
the distribution and collection of ratings information, however, branch offices had to 
proactively inspect a vast number of firms to stay current. Failing this led to a greater 
risk of out of date information spreading, leaving Dun open to criticism and litigation.   
Inasmuch as ratings were more useful to subscribers, Dun increased its revenue 
potential.  Unfortunately for the agency, much of this additional revenue was used to 
subsidize the growing cost of providing ledger entries on an increasing number of 
firms.  Otherwise it was amortized across a growing number of libel cases that resulted 
from the ratings flaws.  The years following the introduction of the ratings format, 
there was certainly a greater need to manage the perceptions of both subscribers and 
evaluated firms.  Dun had hoped to maintain its reputation among its subscribers as an 
information expert by tending to the functionality of ratings, thus keeping revenue 
potential high.  Equally important was the desire to avoid lawsuits, which eroded both 
its reputation and financial position.  As research by Cohen (2012) revealed, however, 
Dun knew that the accuracy of ratings was difficult to ensure.  Since functionality 
could not be taken for granted, Dun had to look for ways to shape the perceptions of 
both subscribers and evaluated firms in a way that reduced criticism.   
Behavioral Response to Accountability Pressure 
In the context of credit-rating assignment, Dun professionals were concerned 
with avoiding attention in the face of scrutiny.  Changes to appraisal scores were the 
most likely way to attract attention among credit-rating stakeholders.  In the same way 
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 Sharing information during an office visit was often reciprocal, which meant that the ledger-based 
reporting process was less costly in terms of both information distribution and collection.   
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that judicial overruling disrupts public policy and invites protestation (Posner 1996), 
ratings volatility prompted contract renegotiation and pricing adjustment, while 
redirecting attention to previously taken-for-granted risk assessments due to the 
alienation of key audience members.  This, of course, made the ratings professionals 
themselves more salient actors in the web of credit and investment activity.  It is 
expected, then, that these experts maintained consistency by minimizing or delaying 
period-to-period changes to their ratings following negative publicity – a time when 
accountability pressure was especially strong.  That is, they relied more heavily on 
past appraisals in the assignment of ratings, to preemptively avoid increasing salience 
and subsequent escalation of scrutiny. 
Additionally, I expect there was a change in the weight that Dun professionals 
placed on certain ratings criteria.  While experts typically rely on detailed, objective 
financial and operating data to help reveal underlying quality or risk potential of others 
(Reilly and Brown 2011), the extent to which evaluators use this performance data to 
make evaluative changes varies across industries and contexts.  It is not uncommon for 
evaluators to supplement this information with indirect, secondary information, 
particularly when the evaluative task is demanding and primary data is limited 
(Sanders and Boivie 2004; Spence 1974).  Decision-makers often look for secondary 
clues to help determine underlying quality, and screen their choices based on the 
presence of attributes they assume are correlated with desirable behavior (Weiss 
1995).  
Characteristics of the firm are often used as such secondary indicators of 
quality (Podolny 1993).  When determining the fitness of a firm, the decision-maker 
uses markers − such as membership in a highly-regarded group − as a proxy for 
underlying performance (Podolny and Phillips 1996).  That is, when the evaluator 
attempts to determine the value of a firm, he can attribute quality to others' regard for 
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a reference group (Podolny 1993) or past performance of the group (Deephouse and 
Suchman 2008).   
But decision-making according to these characteristics may also be an 
important resource used to maintain credibility or to avoid scrutiny, regardless of how 
they serve to help ascertain quality.  A study of performance appraisals by 
Longenecker, Sims, and Gioia (1987), for example, described political motivations 
leading to deliberate distortions of employee performance ratings.  Often, managers 
were not concerned with providing accurate ratings, rather the ratings assigned were 
based on criteria they expected would help them avoid confrontations or avoid looking 
incompetent.  Tziner, Prince, and Murphy (1997) administered a survey to assess the 
extent to which employee performance appraisals were affected by office politics.  
Supervisors in this study avoided giving performance marks that may have 
antagonized others or required additional justification, such as low ratings to vocal 
employees or high ratings to workers that smacked of favoritism.  Emerging research 
in organizational theory also shows that, at times, evaluators would rather avoid 
having to justify a decision – especially if things go wrong – by simply coordinating 
evaluation criteria with widely-accepted beliefs about a firm or its reference group or, 
by the same token, avoiding criteria which reflect a point of view that goes against 
these beliefs (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004; Jensen 2006).   
An important premise in the current study is that credit agents will be more 
politically-minded in this regard, as a preemptive approach to managing audience 
impressions when facing scrutiny, especially at those times when audience attention 
focused on the ratings’ shortcomings is heightened (Elsbach et al. 1998).  I expect that 
agents will delay making as many changes to ratings as possible under heightened 
scrutiny.  However, changes that agents do make should reflect the desire to avoid 
having to justify a decision. 
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As previously mentioned, accountability research shows that decision-makers 
can simplify their decision-making processes when held accountable by adopting a 
heuristic that proves to be unproblematic among audience members (Tetlock 1983).  
While such a heuristic is typically based on specific audience preferences (otherwise, 
the decision-maker will tend to avoid simplifying heuristics), it is possible that the 
actor will invoke a simplifying strategy, even when these preferences are not known.  
Recent experimental work by Ridgeway, Correll, Zuckerman, Bloch, and Jank (2011) 
propose a shift to a “third order belief” when specific views are unclear.  They suggest 
that when specifics of the audience’s beliefs (“second order,” as opposed to the 
decision maker’s own “first order beliefs”) are unknown, the actor will favor a 
commonly-known convention or appeal to a universal logic.  Here, one can 
conservatively gamble that the need to justify will be avoided and that decision-
making will be simplified.  Elsbach (1994) and Suchman (1995) both suggest that 
organizations can adopt normative procedures or goals to signal legitimacy and 
conformity to these third-order beliefs.  That is, they can adopt practices that reflect 
conformity to culturally accepted norms as a way to avoid the need to justify behavior.  
This suggests that, in response to heightened scrutiny, credit agents will base their 
ratings more heavily on criteria that reflect cultural norms. 
Commercial Norms: Calculability and Transparency  
As Dun rolled out its ratings format, important changes to the culture of 
American credit exchange was gaining momentum.  In the same way that life 
insurance diffused in early 19
th
 century America (see Zelizer 1978 for a review) and 
civil service reform spread at the turn of the century (see Tolbert and Zucker 1983), 
there was a general movement to rationalize and formalize the management of credit 
terms between exchange partners during the post-bellum period.  Rapid commercial 
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expansion motivated merchants in the country’s large commercial centers to more 
precisely access, quantify, and calculate elements of a partner’s credit risk profile 
(Oligario 2006).  This enlargement of trade, coupled with flaws in slow-moving 
bankruptcy laws also led larger manufacturers and middlemen to insist that trading 
partners make their financial and ownership structures more visible.  By the 1870s, the 
use of formal exchange documents and financial statements by merchants in the large 
commercial centers became widespread (Oligario 2006:140).  As Oligario points out, 
in the years following the Civil War, “(commercial) norms increasingly included the 
idea that individuals should make their financial statements and record of past 
behavior available to current and prospective creditors,” (Oligario 2006:7), ”… 
suppliers wanted to deal with businesses whose ownership and financial structures 
could be scrutinized and whose statements could be independently confirmed by local 
sources” (Oligario 2006:127).   
It should be noted that as this post-bellum insistence on calculability and 
transparency gained momentum among traders, credit reporting firms remained 
skeptical about the efficacy of these principles as indices of trustworthiness. Credit 
agents questioned the value of financial and organizational paperwork, as it was often 
incomplete and inaccurate.  Moreover, past experience proved the link between the 
creditworthiness of their reporting subjects and the transparency of their business 
practices during this period to be weak.  Olegario (1999) demonstrates this in a study 
of post-bellum Jewish merchants.  While the closure and secrecy of Jewish business 
networks at the time yielded opaque ownership and financing structures, this structure 
actually served to boost the merchants’ economic potential.   
Credit-rating agents at Dun and Co. were well aware of the tradeoff between 
accuracy on one hand and calculability and transparency on the other.  At any other 
period in the agency’s history, we might not have expected these agents to use 
 34 
formality and visibility as principal bases for appraising creditworthiness.  Under 
scrutiny, however, these agents would likely have embraced these principles. If we 
assume decision-makers are likely to conform to their audience’s views as good faith 
measures to cope with accountability pressure, then credit-rating agents at Dun would 
likely would have penalized firms lacking transparency and placed more emphasis on 
precise asset levels when facing intense scrutiny.   
Key Periods 
Credit reporting activities in the mid-19
th
 century were done during a period of 
constant scrutiny.  However there were key moments in Dun’s history when the 
spotlight on the firm, its ledgers, and its ratings was brightest.   
1865 – Forward  
The mid-1860s marked a key transitional period for the firm, when Dun made 
a heavily-promoted entry into the realm of credit rating.  The Mercantile Agency 
released its first ratings book in 1859, continuing to publish volumes until 1861, when 
the Civil War forced The Dun Agency to suspend production.   However, these early 
ratings books were released with a fair amount of discretion.  At this time, the format 
was treated as a mere accessory to the ledger records, and little if any advertising 
accompanied their release (Cohen 2012:603).  In fact, a public defense of the ratings 
was issued in 1860, which strongly encouraged the use of the full ledger information 
when examining ratings. At the same time, internal communications revealed that 
management was reluctant to issue the books (Cohen 2012:903).  Ratings in these 
earlier books were also limited in scope.  Only a single “credit” statistic was included, 
only a limited geographic area was covered, and many businesses with smaller 
estimated worth were overlooked (Cohen 2012:903).  Furthermore, the Agency 
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expressly claimed to have consulted others in order to generate many of these ratings 
(Mercantile Agency 1859).   
Following the Civil War, ratings were re-released, with a strong advertising 
campaign starting in 1865.  This same year marked a sharp shift in the firm’s 
information distribution strategy.  Up until this time, interface with subscribers was 
almost exclusively an oral reading of ledger entries to subscribers at the main or local 
branch offices.  In 1865, Dun explicitly moved to include ratings books in their 
distribution approach.  To that end, the agency widened the geographic scope and 
coverage of their ratings, while making changes to their pricing plan to make it easier 
for subscribers to purchase the ratings books (Cohen 2012:1899-903).  To complement 
advertising, a public relations campaign was started this year, extolling the virtues of 
the ratings (despite a private awareness of their flaws and aversion to their use).   
From 1865 on, the circulation of these newly-introduced ratings, along with 
dramatic rise in the rate of new offices being opened, Dun’s exposure grew.  And 
though ratings became a larger part of the reporting repertoire, there was a heightened 
awareness of the information contained in the ledger record.  I expect to see changes 
in the content and management of the ledgers at this point in time, as a consequence of 
this awareness There should be a growing concern for source credibility, if not for the 
functional utility of the information.   
1877 – 1878  
As subscriptions grew, so did criticism and litigation among evaluated firms.  
These firms were suspicious of changes to the reporting process, taking advantage of 
Dun’s heightened exposure and the ratings’ shortcomings to make their concerns more 
visible (Madison 1974; Norris 1978).  The most vocal critics believed that, 
“improvements in the quality of [agencies’] service were possible and necessary if 
they were to earn wide acceptance from American businessmen” (Madison 1974, see 
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also Earling 1890, Atherton 1946, Wyatt-Brown 1966).  The business community, on 
the other hand, largely recognized the vital function that credit reporting agencies 
performed (Norris 1978:128; Olegario 2006:168).   
The public no doubt took advantage of the financial panic in 1873 to fuel these 
attacks.  The Panic of 1873 was the start of a severe, nationwide economic depression 
in the United States that lasted until 1878.  A series of economic setbacks caused this 
panic: shifts in US monetary policy, railroad speculation after the Civil War, the 1871 
Chicago Fire, and a nationwide influenza epidemic, to name a few.  Major financial 
institutions and manufacturing interests failed during this period, leaving many 
entrepreneurs in ruin. Subscribers were stuck with these broken businesses − ill-
founded relationships with once-trusted entrepreneurs that had been covered by the 
ratings agencies.  In the same way that today’s investors are questioning financial 
intermediaries regarding their role in reporting on firms that failed during our most 
recent financial crisis, the public turned to the credit agencies en masse to help make 
sense of the unexpected failure of so many firms in the mid 1870’s.  All ratings 
agencies – not just Dun – faced a real crisis of trust at this point; already accused of 
shoddy work, this put even more pressure on them to defend the legitimacy of their 
claim to evaluative expertise.   
Criticism of the ratings industry reached an unexpected high point with the 
publication of an 1876 exposé by a former Dun employee, Thomas Meagher.  This 
attack centered on the quality of the field reporter and his appraisals, “chance 
contributions of intelligence from, generally, the least self-respecting and least-liked 
man in his own community” (Meagher 1876:17-18), and on the ambiguity of the 
summary ratings  While Meagher’s publication was more passionate than measured, it 
took stock in the central ideas of the essay.  Credit-rating firms such as Dun 
immediately dismissed his claims, but Meagher was a gifted writer who appealed to 
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the public’s growing distrust of the reporters and their appraisal process (Norris 
1978:126).   
Until this time, credit-rating firms were generally unshaken by the the slowly 
mounting public criticism.  In the years following the Meagher report, however, 
ratings agencies such as Dun became especially concerned with the real and perceived 
threat that this unwanted, unexpected exposé introduced.  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
from 1876-1878, there was a rise in the number of cases being brought to trial 
involving credit reporting agencies.  This litigious activity, together with the looming 
threat of losing current and potential subscribers, made Dun’s management especially 
worried about the impression customers had of the growing credit-rating industry and 
its exemplars (Madison 1974); in fact, internal correspondence reveals preparations for 
a public relations campaign, defending ratings to concerned customers (Norris 1978; 
Cohen 2012). 
Since much of the reporting activity at Dun occurred at the local level, it is 
possible that there were also local conditions that generated regional variation in the 
experience Dun professionals had with accountability pressure during the post-bellum 
period.  It so happens that, beginning in 1877, accountability pressure was especially 
high in the Southern States.  This was the end of the Reconstruction Era in the U.S., 
and with the Compromise of 1877, Army intervention in the South ceased.  Citizens in 
the North were wary of Southerners during the decades following the Civil War, and 
this sudden removal of local governance left Northern merchants concerned about the 
political and commercial stability in the region (Doyle 1990).  Local credit reporters 
were the crutch on which these merchants leaned for information and assurance 
(Norris 1978). I expect that the drive to protect the reputation of the agency was acute 
in this geographic location.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXAMINATION OF CREDIT RATINGS  
Data for Examining Credit Ratings 
One of the strengths of 19th Century credit-rating as a research site is the 
availability of data on credit scores and firm characteristics.  The study employs data 
from the R. G. Dun Reference Book, the most extensive listing of business 
classifications and credit-ratings in the 19th century (Norris 1978).  To focus attention 
on the period of intense public censure at Dun, I sampled firm data from 1866-1880 in 
the Reference Book, focusing on activity from 1871-1880.  In 1870, across all 
geographic areas it covered, Dun listed credit information for 430,573 proprietary 
enterprises; ten years later, the total was roughly 764,000 (Vose 1916).  I narrowed my 
sampling frame so that all sampled businesses would be located in a region where 
institutional and economic conditions were relatively homogeneous.  I also chose a 
geographic area where reported firms would best represent the kinds of firms that 
required the intervention of an information intermediary or expert – an area that was 
geographically distant and embedded in local customs, practices, and economic 
conditions that customers may not have been able to readily appraise on their own.  I 
chose the Cotton South as a strategic site for empirical analysis – specifically the 
coastal cities of New Orleans and Charleston, which were both central Southern 
commercial hubs and home to the two primary local Dun offices operating in the 
South.  The fitness of firms in these two cities was strongly tied to the success of a 
single commodity crop, even when those enterprises did not directly engage in the 
production or distribution of cotton, and the context within which firms operated was 
distinct from that of the typical Northeast trader.  Specifically, the Southern cities 
explored in this study experienced exogenous change related to Reconstruction.  As 
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expressed earlier, one can imagine that such change elevated concern for the fitness 
and transparency of businesses plying their trade in this region.    
The July 1870 edition of the Reference Book identified 19,929 businesses in 
the larger Cotton South; the July 1880 edition contained 31,673 organizations in the 
region (approximately 4% of all firms enumerated by Dun).  From the two major 
commercial centers therein, I focus on a sample of 10,604 – proprietorships that 
operated for at least two years each from 1871-1880.
12
  For each case, information was 
coded on the business location, name(s) of proprietor(s), proprietor demographics, 
governance structure of the business, capital assets, industrial classification, and 
credit-rating history. Using proprietor names, I linked businesses that had a common 
first and (where applicable) disclosed second owner from year to year.
13
  List-wise 
deletion removed cases that were either cross-listed duplicates, had missing 
information on capital assets, or were only reported for a single year, leaving 9,664 
cases for purposes of multivariate analysis.   
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
  “Credit Ratings.”  Credit evaluations serve as the dependent variable in the 
analysis.  These measures of creditworthiness were core elements of the new reporting 
format introduced in limited scope by Dun just prior to the Civil War, and then sold 
                                                          
12
 Data from 1861-1870 were used as needed in order to calculate historical measures for each firm, 
such as prior failure and length of credit history. 
13
 The addition or subtraction of third (or more)-listed owners or undisclosed investors (“& co”) would  
be treated in Dun records as noteworthy, substantial changes in the outward appearance (“style”), asset 
level, and human or social capital of the firm. Nevertheless, formal dissolution of the firm typically only 
occurred when first or second disclosed proprietors were changed.  It is worth noting here that firms 
often carried on as ongoing concerns after such dissolutions.  The impact of this imprinting on the 
evaluation of such firms by repeat customers and reporters is a topic I am addressing in my own 
ongoing research.  However, for the purpose of this study, tracking these histories would not have been 
practical.  
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thorough the widespread distribution of their Reference Books in the years that 
followed.  In summarizing the credit worthiness of an enterprise, correspondents were 
instructed to consider factors such as capital assets, the “nature, extent and hazard of 
business,” qualifications of proprietors, and firm strengths and weaknesses (Norris 
1978:55).  During the postbellum period, firms were ranked among seven credit 
categories, ranging from “A1” for a respected firm with unlimited credit, and “1” or 
“1.5” for firms with strong credit ratings, down to “2” or “2.5” indicating good credit, 
“3” indicating fair credit, and “3.5” indicating an undesirable credit report. The 
distribution of ratings was highly skewed, with many businesses receiving undesirable 
ratings (roughly 55% in the Cotton South) and few receiving strong or unlimited credit 
endorsements (less than 2% at a rating of 1.5 or higher).  For purposes of analysis, 
ratings were reverse-coded into an ordinal scale ranging from “1” (undesirable report) 
to “7” (unlimited credit). 
Key Independent Measures 
The selection of predictor variables here was designed to first gauge Dun’s 
attempts at conformity.  Of key interest are two structural dimensions of appraised 
firms that are among the most prominent in the literature on mid-19
th
 century credit 
reporting – dimensions tied to the norms of calculability and transparency that had 
emerged in the U.S. business community by the 1830s and 1840s.   
The dimension that most directly reflected conformity to norms of calculability 
− the growing demand in the business community for more systematic, quantitative 
reporting procedures – was capital assets.  Despite shortcomings addressed earlier, 
using capital as a measure of creditworthiness suggested to a potentially critical 
audience a level precision and neutrality.  This kind of quantitative information grants 
the organization a certain level of source credibility (Porter 1995) – a legitimate means 
to an end, despite variation in the technical quality of its outcomes, that protects it 
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from immediate sanctions (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  Capital is captured directly, 
here, through Dun’s “pecuniary strength” classification – the ten-category scale that 
was actually recorded in Reference Books just alongside credit ratings themselves.  
Dun professionals used these scores to rank firms that ranged from the smallest 
enterprises (referenced by the code “K”) with less than $2,000 in working capital to 
the largest firms (referenced by “A+”) possessing more than one million dollars in 
capital assets.  Although a firm’s assets were logically independent from its sister 
credit-rating, R.G. Dun emphasized that assessments of capital worth should be an 
important criteria for the evaluations offered by his agents, leading to a high 
correlation between these measures.  For purposes of analysis, I converted capital 
assets into a continuous measure using mid-point estimation and logged the measure 
to reduce skewness.  The small number of top-coded firms (N=245) were assigned 
assets of one-and-a-half million dollars prior to log transformation.   
As mentioned previously, the mid-19
th
 Century business community also 
pushed for greater transparency in business transactions and relationship building.  
Transparency can be thought of broadly as openness and access to information 
(Stiglitz 2002), and, in the context of credit reporting, transparency can be determined 
by either the behavior of the firm (information sought directly by Dun professionals 
could be refused by the firm’s proprietor or management team, for example) or by the 
existence of certain structural properties.   
To operationalize transparency, I considered the following six structural 
variables that could plausibly gauge transparency – or the lack thereof –– that Dun 
agents might face when appraising a firm.    
Hybridity is a binary indicator that equals one for any firm that is listed as 
belonging to more than one unrelated line of business.  Organizations that span 
boundaries in this way present problems for the observer.  Experts and more general 
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audiences come to associate certain features with particular categories and evaluate 
organizations on that basis.  Because organizations that span multiple lines-of-business 
are unlikely to feature the prototypical features of each one – they make it difficult for 
others to match performance with expectations at the individual category level and 
record results according to a unified standard (Hannan et al. 2007).  Dun agents were 
sensitive, themselves, to such problems of classification.  During the post-bellum 
period, Dun agents categorized firms according to an internally-developed industrial 
classification scheme and met firms that failed to fit cleanly within this classification 
scheme with discounted ratings (Ruef and Patterson 2009b).    
It should be noted that the 1870s were still a transitional period in the 
evolutional and institutional history this scheme.  Dun professionals were still learning 
the scheme and so were less likely to have strong, taken-for-granted expectations 
anchored in particular categories.  Furthermore, it was not uncommon for many firms 
during the decade – especially those outside urban areas of commerce − to engage in 
diversified trade that defied classification.  In some rural locales, hybridity appeared to 
be the norm, rather than the exception.  However, agents in the larger cities had 
greater exposure to and experience with the scheme, for metropolitan areas such as 
New Orleans and Charleston housed long-standing local Dun offices with 
professionals that had the most tenure and know-how (Norris 1978).  Furthermore, the 
division of labor among businesses in these commercial centers was much more well-
defined than in rural areas, and trade was more specialized (see Ruef and Patterson 
2009a). Consequently, the classification scheme used by agents more closely mapped 
the folk taxonomy of the business community, who, by the 1870s, “already questioned 
whether a proprietor could functionally combine the skills of [trades such as the] 
apothecary and grocer” (Ruef and Patterson 2009b). This concept is perhaps most 
important, as the heightened reliance on transparency as a matter of conformity was 
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much less about the agents’ own, intrinsic, cognitive problems of meaning than about 
their motivation to strategically match the normative position of their audience and its 
basis.   
Wholesale is a binary indicator that equals one (each) for any firm listed in the 
Reference Books as belonging to the wholesale trade.  The wholesaler of the 19
th
 
century was central to the early, pre-Civil War growth of trade volume across the 
United States.  Acting as a marketing intermediary for manufacturers of non-
agricultural goods, the autonomous wholesale merchant shipped products across 
various geographic markets to retailers or to the final consumer.  Mid-century 
manufacturers did not have the financial or managerial resources needed to support the 
sale of goods to distant urban centers, and, thus needed this intermediary to penetrate 
these markets (Porter and Livesay 1971).  Not unlike ratings agencies themselves, 
wholesale merchants typically operated a decentralized network of physical offices in 
distant urban centers – nearly 5% of firms in New Orleans and Charleston from 1871-
1880 were listed as wholesalers – with central proprietorship located centrally in a 
Northeastern trade center such as New York or Boston.  While most wholesale 
merchants specialized in one line of business, on first contact, customers, suppliers, 
and creditors dealing with these enterprises faced considerable uncertainty as to how 
much inventory or labor was devoted to a particular geographic market and, in some 
cases, whether such commitments were stable throughout the year or subject to 
seasonal variation.  This type of structural arrangement, like the hybrid form, reduced 
the firm’s transparency.   
With the reduced cost of distant trade in the years following the Civil War, the 
structure of markets for non-agricultural goods changed.  Manufacturers were able to 
develop devoted merchandising and marketing systems that were independent of the 
autonomous wholesaler (Porter and Livesay 1971).  Middle-men that had once been 
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intermediaries for the large sugar and cotton plantations in the Southern ports were 
now re-emerging as dedicated representatives of the manufacturer.  During the 
Reconstruction period, these “agents” – over 10% of the firms in New Orleans and 
Charleston − formed a profitable segment of the coastal city landscape than began to 
rival the incumbent wholesaler.  Nevertheless, tracking assets for these firms was 
often hit or miss, for their operations were typically subsidized by the manufacturer 
they represented. Out-of-town assets and activities were difficult for potential business 
partners to monitor effectively, again presenting transparency problems.  It should be 
noted that, as a heuristic, membership in either the wholesale trade or structural 
position as a manufacturer’s agent could be a proxy for above average performance or 
even a status marker.  Collectively, these firms were, according to listed assets, four 
times the size of all other firms ($150k vs. $40k) sampled from New Orleans and 
Charleston. Over half of these businesses were involved in shipping high status luxury 
goods (65% vs. 25% other firms; see Marler 2010 for post-bellum stratification of 
trades in New Orleans), and had a coverage history with Dun that lasted nearly a year 
longer than other firms.  I expect that reduced ratings for these types of firms would 
have been based on their opaque structures, not on their realized or perceived financial 
performance.    
A challenge similar in nature to the opacity of the manufacturer’s agent 
structure existed with firms listed in the undisclosed partner style.  A firm listed as 
“A. Smith & Co.” was effectively a partnership, involving one or more unnamed 
investors (the “co(s)”, in Dun vernacular), who trusted Smith with the physical 
management of the firm’s day to day affairs, which was not an uncommon 
organizational structure (over 16% of firms in sample listed “& co”).  However, 
suppliers expressed the desire to deal with firms whose ownership could be more 
closely scrutinized and independently confirmed (Oligario 2006:127).   
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Opacity might also lie in the division of responsibility within a disclosed 
partnership.  Upon detailed inspection of ledger records, I determined that 
proprietorships typically take on an additional partner for one of three reasons:  for 
additional capital, for greater expertise (especially when diversifying into an 
unfamiliar line of business), or out of loyalty (a former clerk or family member 
brought on board in a low-ante arrangement, after years of administrative service).  
Unfortunately for the potential exchange partner, it is unclear which of these reasons 
form the basis of a partnership.  Asset level or line of business changes might provide 
a clue, but this requires more than the cross-sectional snapshot provided in the 
Reference Books.  For this reason, I include fully-disclosed partnership among the 
plausible measures of transparency.   
Lastly, I include female-run businesses as a structural dimension.  Often, such 
businesses were only nominally run by women.  To protect themselves from 
collections activities, husbands or male relatives were often the true proprietors of 
these firms, making the firm and its potential difficult to appraise.  It should be noted 
that even firms legitimately run by women were suspect during this period.  The 19th 
century business community questioned the commitment of female proprietors, 
thought to consider running a business only a temporary endeavor, en route to 
marriage and family (Olegario 2006:110).  Furthermore, firms typically owned by 
women were, on average, thinly capitalized – not expected to be very profitable.  
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency was among the possible concerns driving the 
evaluation of these firms.  
Factor Analysis 
To assess my intuition, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (Kim and 
Mueller 1978) for these structural characteristics, expecting to find these measures 
cluster into a group around at common “opacity” dimension.  I replaced means for 
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missing values whenever encountered for these variables, and then I extracted the 
factors revealed by this technique. Using a principal component method, I extracted 
those factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.  I then generated the loadings shown in 
Table 1 by applying varimax rotation techniques and counting components with 
loadings greater than .60 on any given factor as related to one another.  
Four of the six structural characteristics cluster fairly cleanly into two groups.  
Hybrid and wholesaler dimensions appear to be linked, as are agent and undisclosed 
partnership.  Disclosed partnership style and female ownership contribute only 
moderately to these dimensions.  Such relationships suggest that four of the six 
measures are related, but that separate discounts exist for lack of domain transparency 
(wholesaler, hybrid) and for lack of proprietor transparency (agent, undisclosed 
partnership).  Negative values are noteworthy, implying that organizations that are 
opaque in one area might, to some small degree, tend toward transparency in another.  
Factor analyses applied to an expanded sample reveals an additional relationship 
between wholesaler and agent with shared negative value – a relationship consistent 
with the noted high performance of these trades during the early Reconstruction period 
(Porter and Livesay 1971; Marler 2010).  While this relationship is not quite strong 
enough to exceed the stated eigenvalue threshold in the primary factor analysis, the 
competing influences – regard for performance vs. aversion to opacity – are 
remarkable.  Because the two extracted factors alone contribute to close to 50 percent 
of the variance in the structural characteristics, one might be compelled to include the 
corresponding factor scores in further analyses.  However, because a percentage score 
above 50 is more commonly acceptable, and given the extra wrinkle of texture due to 
the possible wholesaler – agent relationship, I decided that the aforementioned 
measures should be included individually to avoid unnecessary difficulties of 
measurement and interpretation.    
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Table 1. Performance Comparisons, by Category 
    
    
Period 
1   
Period 
2   
Period 
3   
    1871-1876 1877-1878 1879-1880 
     Mean Change in             
Assets ($1000s log)             
  Wholesale 0.17 * 0.26 * -0.02   




Agent -0.01   0.16   -0.06 * 
  Other 0.01   0.09   0.05 * 
  
 
Hybrid 0.11 ** 0.05   -0.05   




Ptnr 0.17 *** 0.23 *** 0.07 * 
  Other 0.05 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 * 
                
Proportion of              
Firms Failing             
  Wholesale 0.03   0.03   0.02   




Agent 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 
  Other 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 
  
 
Hybrid 0.03   0.02   0.05   




Ptnr 0.02   0.02   0.05   
  Other 0.03   0.03   0.03   
* p < .05;  ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Statistical Test of Performance Differences 
To assess my intuition further, I performed a series of statistical tests to 
determine the relative performance of firms with these transparency-related structural 
characteristics, which is to judge whether changes in credit rating criteria emphases 
are based on performance impact, rather than on cultural impact.   Table 2 reports the 
mean change in assets and failure proportions – for each structural category – relative 
to other firms, with significance levels coming from t-tests and test of proportions, 
respectively.  Each period is listed independently here, revealing changes in relative 
performance through the period of heightened accountability.  If changes in emphasis 
on structural characteristics when assigning ratings were based on performance 
impact, then there should be a remarkable decline in mean asset change during the 
1877-1878 period for each of these categories and a remarkable rise in failure rates.   
 
Table 2. Rotated Factor Solution for Proprietor and Domain Opacity (N=9664) 






Wholesale 0.0006 0.807 0.349 
Hybrid -0.182 0.640 0.558 
(Mfr) Agent 0.775 -0.210 0.356 
Undisclosed Partner 0.580 0.384 0.517 
Partnership 0.486 -0.019 0.763 




As these statistics show, the only apparent erosion in the performance of evaluated 
firms is among hybrids in period 2, though these results are not significant.  
Additional Variables 
Though “female” and “partnership” do not fall neatly into one of the two 
opacity groups and indicated in the above factor analysis, I do list them as separate 
controls.  Partnerships are becoming an increasingly less popular form of organizing in 
the port cities of the Cotton South during my window of observation – 21% 
partnerships in 1871 vs. 18% in 1880 – a trend that may be reflected in the ratings.  
Transparency issues aside, female proprietorship might also be discounted based on 
separate character concerns.  Members of the 19th century business community often 
believed that women had a fleeting involvement in business affairs, considering 
proprietorship a “stepping stone” to other pursuits, such as marriage and raising a 
family (Olegario 2006:110).  Other characteristics of proprietors (e.g. ethnicity, 
religious background, etc.) are unavailable in the Reference Book, but are controlled 
for indirectly by clustering standard errors among repeated observations at the firm 
level.  I also control for proprietor “credit history,” with a running tally of the number 
of years the firm has been listed in the Reference Book.  As a final measure of 
capacity – the proprietor’s ability to run a business effectively – I record “past failure” 
as a binary indicator that equals one for any firm that had previously been assigned a 
“blank” for both asset level and credit-rating.  Using Reference Book data from 1866-
1879, I identified periods where the firm had been assigned neither a credit score nor 
an asset value.  Ledger material revealed that both the New Orleans and the Charleston 
offices assigned a double blank when a firm experienced failure.  Failure, in this case, 
refers to firms that either (a) went bankrupt, (b) were sued for nonpayment, (c) failed, 
or (d) had to arrange an extension, assignment or compromise on their debts were 
considered to have failed. Verification through sampling suggests that 95% of all 
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double blanks accurately report business failure.  Firms that simply closed down, 
where one partner bought out the other, or where the owner retired or moved away, 
did not receive these double blanks.   
In addition to the aforementioned organizational characteristics, I also examine 
local market conditions and their effect on credit ratings.  I suspect that a greater focus 
on legitimacy and impression management during the period of heightened 
accountability might lead to a greater focus on the firm itself, and not on the larger 
context.
14
  To control for the expected performance at the industry level, I also 
reported the “number of failures” each year within the firm’s principal line of 
business.  Although I strategically limited observations to those in New Orleans and 
Charleston to ensure cultural and economic consistency, I include fixed effects for 
firms that were assigned ratings by the “New Orleans” branch office to address the 
possibility that specific geographic market conditions affected credit scores.   
“Rating, n-1” is simply a lagged dependent variable to provide evidence of 
“stickiness” – how dependent the raters were on past evaluations during the censure 
period.  The higher the coefficient, the more influence the previous rating had on 
current assignment.  In subsequent analyses, I explore the stability of ratings during 
the period of heightened accountability, drawing attention to the nuances of this 
relationship.  For the current analysis, I simply wished to control for any anchoring 
effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) past ratings may have on current views of a 
firm’s creditworthiness. I was concerned that there was memory recall associated with 
more distant changes that might also contribute significantly to the assignment of 
ratings.  However, a supplemental analysis substituting an average of past ratings for 
                                                          
14
 Samples of ledger entries described in later sections were used to sketch trends across the entire 
1866-1880 period.  However, a preliminary examination of 1877-1878 suggests that Dun professionals 
were a little less likely to contextualize poor performance (e.g., “but for the times”) than before. 
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this one-year lag revealed no significant difference in the results, and I do not report 
the results from this analysis.    
Analysis – Ordered Logit Analysis  
Credit-Ratings 
I use an ordered logit specification to examine credit rating scores and predict 
the ranking of each firm in the Dun credit-rating system.  Model specifications 
considered which criteria were correlated with credit evaluation and whether the effect 
of parameters of theoretical interest during the period of heightened accountability 
(1877-78) differed from both earlier (1871-1876) and later periods (1878-1880) in 
magnitude and significance.  As noted earlier, because I use data with repeated 
observations from each proprietorship in this analysis, I specify the models so that 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Results 
Table 3 reports the effect of structural characteristics and various controls on 
credit ratings for three periods.  First, model (1) provides a baseline model with results 
from the pooled sample of credit ratings from all years.  Here, estimates suggest that a 
lack of focus was penalized by Dun agents.  Results here suggest that, throughout the 
observation window, firms with greater capital asset levels have better credit ratings.  
A sole proprietorship that only had $1,000 in assets in 1871 could expect an 
undesirable credit report (“3.5” rating, net of other factors).  However, a proprietorship 
that had $100,000 in assets could expect a strong credit report (“1.5” rating).  
Examining these pooled results makes it difficult to draw a conclusion about lower 
domain transparency – being either a wholesale or hybrid firm.  Wholesale firms are 
more likely to receive a higher rating here, while hybrid firms are less likely to receive 
one.  Similarly, conclusions about proprietor transparency are difficult to make here.  
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Firms serving as manufacturing agents receive disproportionately higher ratings, while 
ratings for undisclosed partnerships are disproportionately lower.  Firms that had 
failed in the past were penalized, as were firms with longer ratings histories.  Past 
research provides evidence to the contrary – suggesting more generous scores were 
assigned to firms with longer histories (Ruef and Patterson 2009b).  Perhaps this 
practice is a reflection of the greater number of rural businesses examined in this 
earlier work, for the length of credit coverage outside the metropolitan centers was 
much shorter (firms in the current study – exclusively from New Orleans and 
Charleston – had credit histories that were over twice as long).  The length of credit 
history could be a proxy for the age of the firm’s proprietors, and age had a mixed 
effect on creditworthiness assessments.  Older business owners had more experience, 
and therefore were thought more capable, while the most advanced in years were 
considered less likely to have the time to settle a bad debt (Mercantile Agency 1853; 
Oligario 2006:107).  Findings regarding other structural characteristics – undisclosed 
partnership arrangements and female managements – are insignificant.  Local market 
conditions, on the other hand, do seem to influence ratings.  Firms in New Orleans 
tend to receive lower ratings, as do firms in higher-failing industries, as expected.   
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Table 3.  Coefficients from the Regression (Ordered Logit Model) of Dun Credit 





























   Assets ($1000s, log) 3.808  *** 3.513 ** 4.169 ** 4.682 ** 
              
Transparency             
   Wholesale 0.472 *** 0.399 * 0.073  0.824 ** 
   Hybrid -1.123 ** -1.049 ** -1.596 *** -1.323 * 
   (Mfr) Agent 0.298 ** 0.245 * -0.105  0.463 ** 









Proprietor Profile             
   Partnership -0.052  -0.082  -0.117  0.042  
   Female 0.306  0.311  0.645  0.428  
              
Firm History             









   Credit History (yrs) -0.046 ** -0.004  -0.005  -0.004  

























































# Observations 9664  4462  2004  3198  
* p < .05;  ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects, two-
tailed otherwise) 
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In model (2), I examine credit rating during the 1871-1876 period, which are 
among the earliest ratings released by Dun. Local offices are uncomfortable with this 
initial move to add the ratings format to their repertoire, but hints of sensitivity to 
external criticism should be more pronounced during the subsequent period of 
heightened accountability.  Consistent with pooled results, discounted ratings are 
associated with hybridity and low industry-level performance; larger firms (higher 
asset level), wholesalers, firms serving as manufacturing agents, and those with 
relatively high ratings the prior year are more likely to receive higher ratings.  If 
agents intend to mask or distract attention from their ratings – anticipating controversy 
– by adopting ratings criteria that appear more rational and prudent, then these 
parameter estimates should change during the 1877-1878 period in notable ways.  
Ratings professionals should be more generous with the ratings assigned to larger 
firms during this period.  That is, appraisals should be based more heavily on asset 
level, signaling a stronger devotion to the principal of calculability.  There should also 
be more severe punishments for hybrid firms and undisclosed partnerships, reflecting 
Dun’s conformity to norms of transparency in their domain and proprietor forms.  
Along these same lines, there should be a change in the parameter estimates for 
wholesale (lack of domain transparency) and agent (lack of proprietor transparency) 
fixed effects.  Because these types of firms are generally well-regarded throughout the 
window of observation (1871-1880), the positive coefficients for these two measures 
seen in the 1871-1876 period should subsequently drop in magnitude and significance 
from 1877-1878 to support conformity claims.   
Model (3) gives the regression results for this second period.  The effect of 
asset level grows markedly here (Wald test 2 = 7.51, p < .01), suggesting that a 
greater emphasis is being placed on this dimension as contextual changes raise Dun’s 
accountability levels.  At the same time, the changes in fixed effects for wholesale 
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(Wald test 2 = 2.76, p < .05) and hybrid firms (Wald test 2 = 1.69, p < .01) suggest a 
growing concern for domain transparency.  More precisely, domain transparency 
concerns during period 2 offset the earlier regard Dun had for wholesale firms 
(decrease in magnitude and significance of the positive coefficient), while earlier 
punishment for hybrid forms becomes more severe during this period (increase in 
magnitude and significance of the negative coefficient).  Similarly, a change in fixed 
effects for firms serving as manufacturing agents (decrease in magnitude and 
significance of the positive coefficient; Wald test 2 = 6.18, p <.05) reveals a growing 
concern for proprietor transparency.  A quick look at the different coefficients for 
undisclosed partnerships seems to provide additional evidence of penalties accruing 
for a lack of proprietor transparency.  However, significance tests for coefficients do 
not provide strong support for parameter fluctuation in this case.   
Other changes offer hints that the pressure to adopt a more impression-
motivated credit rating process during this period changed not only the nature but also 
the scope of ratings criteria.  While, on one hand, firms that had failed previously 
faced stronger penalties during this period – effects for prior failure were greater in 
both magnitude and significance (Wald test 2 = 10.14, p <.05) – ratings professionals 
seemed to pay less attention to the context of a firm’s performance.  Local market 
conditions reflected in fixed effects for city (“New Orleans”) decreased in magnitude 
and significance (Wald test 2 = 9.25, p <.01), as did those reflected in the number of 
failures among others in the firm’s industry, albeit much more modestly (Wald test 2 
= .95, p <.10).  Greater dependence on past ratings is consistent with these findings.  
The coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is greater in magnitude in period 2 
(Wald test 2 = 10.69, p <.001), and changes in predicted probabilities show that 
ratings are 13% more likely to stay the same from year to year, which is to say that 
ratings professionals are likely more myopic in their ratings approach – ceremonially 
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employing external assessment criteria and dismissing a more comprehensive 
definition of worth that may dampen a strong conformity signal.   
If conformity pressures are strongest under conditions of heightened 
accountability, then most key parameter estimates should shift once again during the 
1879-1880 period, as audience attention to ratings subsides.  Model (4) gives the 
regression results for this third period.  As expected, changes in fixed effects for 
wholesale firms (Wald test 2 = 4.71, p < .05) suggest less of a concern for domain 
transparency and a return to the earlier regard Dun had for wholesale firms (increase 
in magnitude and significance of the positive coefficient) in period 1.  Hybrid firms 
seem to suffer fewer penalties, though results are not quite as conclusive (Wald test 2 
= .82, p < .10).  Though effects related to undisclosed partnerships are inconclusive, a 
change in fixed effects for firms serving as manufacturing agents (increase in 
magnitude and significance of the positive coefficient; Wald test 2 = 6.77, p <.01) 
also reveals less of a concern for proprietor transparency.  In an unexpected twist, the 
coefficient for asset level during period 3 is not significantly different from the 
coefficient in period 2.  Though, as prior research suggests (Norris 1978; Ruef and 
Patterson 2009b), the importance of firms’ capital assets in assessing creditworthiness 
not only increased during the window of observation, but also led to a permanent 
change in firm policy.  Management made it clear to ratings professionals that “there 
should be a constant effort to keep the credit marking [of firms] in close relation to 
[their] capital marking” (quoted in Norris 1978:93).  Furthermore, a key to asset level 
categories and credit ratings in the Reference Book was made available throughout the 
window of observation, published in a “side-by-side” style that clearly suggested a 
strong relationship between the two measures.    
Results for period 3 suggest a very modest decrease in emphasis on firm-level 
failure, as well as modest increases in emphasis on local market conditions, indicating 
 57 
the agency’s willingness to attribute performance to the larger economic climate.  A 
change in lagged dependent variable effects is pronounced (Wald test 2 = 9.24, p 
<.01), indicating less reliance than previously on past ratings.  Together, these results 
suggest a slightly wider lens is being used to appraise firms as accountability pressure 
subsides.   
Analysis – Ratings Change / Multinomial Logit Analyses 
To examine ratings changes more intuitively than in ordered logit 
specifications, I performed a multinomial analysis, classifying credit rating outcomes 
into three categories: increase, decrease, and no change.
15
 These outcomes were 
measured as changes to credit scores recorded from the previous to the current 
reporting period.  I used this method of analysis to estimate simultaneous logistic 
regression models with pairwise comparisons of credit rating increase and credit rating 
decrease against the base category of no change.  Two models reported in Table 4 
were estimated; model 1 included organizational characteristics (changes in assets, 
partnership structure, and industry) and location as controls.  Then model 2 added a 0-
1 indicator variable for ratings occurring during the years of heightened 
accountability, 1877-1878, as well as terms assessing the sign and significance of the 
aforementioned controls during this accountability period by interacting these terms 
with the 0-1 indicator.  Claims about the stability of ratings are supported if the 
standalone 0-1 indicator term is negative and significant for both increase and 
decrease estimates, because after controlling for other factors that predict ratings 
movement, it will indicate a general tendency toward the base “no change” category 
from 1877-1888.   
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 A separate category – the assignment of a “non”-rating – was also possible. The results listed here 







Table 4. Coefficient Estimates for the Multinomial Logit Model (N=9664) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Rating Decrease Rating Increase Rating Decrease Rating Increase 
Asset, Change ($1000s, log) -1.761 *** 2.481 *** -1.718 *** 2.322 *** 
Change to WS/Agent 0.929 * 0.588   0.570   0.968   
Undiscl Ptnr Added 0.844 *** 0.262   0.756 ** 0.101   
Undiscl Ptnr Dropped 0.786 *** 0.621 * 0.698 ** 0.693 * 
Unrel Business Added 1.225 ** 0.848   1.776 ** 0.969   
Unrel Business Dropped -0.442   1.232 ** -0.259   1.914 ** 
New Orleans 0.205 * 0.411 *** 0.177 * 0.408 *** 
                  
Mid Period (1877-1878) -   -   -0.337 *** -0.316 * 
Mid X Asset, Change -   -   -0.176   0.680 ** 
Mid X Change to WS/Agent -   -   1.141   -3.982 *** 
Mid X Undiscl Ptnr Added -   -   0.401   0.540   
Mid X Undiscl Ptnr Dropped -   -   0.336   -0.363   
Mid X Unrel Business Added -   -   -13.733 *** -0.591   
Mid X Unrel Business 
Dropped -   -   -11.985 *** -15.423 *** 
                  
Constant -2.663 *** -3.407 *** -2.548 *** -3.322 *** 
Chi-square   340.29***     1594.94***   
* p < .05;  ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects, two-tailed otherwise) 




For the purposes of assessing the dynamic nature of ratings, I regressed the 
aforementioned ratings changes on change during the same measurement period in the 
relevant controls:  change in asset level, shift into a line-of-business with lower 
transparency (wholesale and manufacturing agent, combined), addition or subtraction 
of an unrelated line-of-business (hybridity), and addition or subtraction of an 
undisclosed partner.  The pattern of results for the period of heightened accountability 
reported here is consistent with my study’s underlying premises that signaling and 
filtering effects will be more pronounced at a time when Dun professionals anticipate 
failure.   
Testing the effect of adding the 1877-1878 term to the control model indicates 
a significant difference in rating change during this period (2 = 18.18, p < .01, df=2), 
substantively showing that changes in ratings are significantly different during this 
period of heightened accountability.  Since the standalone 0-1 indicator term is, 
indeed, negative and significant for both increase and decrease estimates, as expected, 
the model provides evidence of greater ratings stability during this time. That is, fixed 
effects for the heightened accountability period following the release of the ratings 
reporting format indicated a negative relationship between accountability pressure and 
change.  Predicted probabilities were calculated both for the 1877-78 observations and 
for the remainder of the observations during the window of observation (earlier and 
later periods), using average values for the control measures.  Results show that 
ratings under these conditions are nearly 11% less likely to change during the 1877-
1878 period.  These differences are also substantial when comparing raw percentages.  
During the heightened accountability period, 29% of firms under review experienced a 
ratings increase or decrease; during the rest of the window of observation from 1871-




Analysis – Performance Changes 
To clarify better the distinction between symbolic and quality-based 
motivations driving the emphasis placed on ratings criteria, attention should be 
directed to Figure 1 – a final analysis designed to help add texture to the regression 
results. For each failure that I used to calculate the control variable “# Fails,” I 
examined the reporting periods leading up to the result. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percent failures anticipated (1871-1880 sample NO, CH) 
 
If, in the year just prior to a firm’s failure, the agency had either downgraded the 
firm’s rating or, if not, had assigned the firm an undesirable credit report, then I 
recorded a “1”.  Otherwise, I recorded a “0”.  Averaging these scores each year 
provided a measure of the proportion of failures that were anticipated by the agency.  
Figure 2 plots these percentages throughout the 1871-80 frame.  As this figure seems 
to suggest, the percent anticipated failures sharply dropped during the period of 
heightened public scrutiny.  
To help support this finding, I included a simple, continuous-time event-
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outcome measure here is time-until-failure; the time-varying covariates are the firm’s 
credit-rating and geographic location (dummy variable = 1 for “New Orleans”).  This 
approach is similar to a multivariate regression in which the dependent variable is the 
(unobserved) transition from one state (active firm) to another (failure).  Like 
regression, this technique compares a coefficient estimate to its standard errors, 
deriving a t-statistic to allow for scientific testing (Tuma and Hannan 1984).  Often, 
when this technique is used, changes in rates are as much a function of time as they 
are a function of any covariate measured.  Several parametric approaches can be used 
to model this time-event relationship (Tuma and Hannan 1984). As seen in Figure 2, 
the rate of failure does not follow a simple time-dependent pattern.  The rate was 
originally quite low, rose sharply during the 1873 Panic, and then varied after 1876.  
When time dependence is likely, but follows no simple parametric shape, a 
proportional hazards model can be used.  Here, the rate of transition is separated into 
two components: uniform variation, over time, across all observations and variation 
tied to covariates specific to each member of the data set (Cox 1972).  The form for 
this Cox model is as follows: 
 H(t) = q(t)exp{α’X(t)} 
The element h(t) is the rate of transition at time t, q(t) is a (possibly) time-dependent 
nuisance function that is not estimated, X(t) is a vector of the covariates, and α is a 
vector of the coefficient(s) corresponding to the covariates. Reducing time dependence 
to this nuisance function effectively frees the model from the need to incorporate a 
fixed parametric form.  For the purposes of this model, events must be treated as 
singular and non-repeatable. Although there are subtle differences among failures, I 
treat all failures indicated by Reference Book blank entries for both pecuniary strength 
and credit rating as equals.  Most failures coded this way involved either legal 




a meeting with creditors, or else proprietors simply absconding and leaving behind a 
noted (by credit reporters) debt to stakeholders.  Given the relatively low percentage 
of coded failures not fitting one of these descriptions, the inferential risk associated 
with aggregation is minor.  I had data from 1866 onward, and because most firms were 
observed for less than 6 years, problems with left-censoring were minimal.  Data were 
not complete from 1881 onward, though right-censoring concerns are effectively 
addressed using the Cox modeling technique (Tuma and Hannan 1984).   
 
 
Table 5. Coefficients from the Cox Proportional Hazard Model Firm Failure (N = 
9664) 
  Model 2    Model 3    Model 4   
Variable 
1871-
1876   
 1877-
1878   
1879-
1880   
Credit Rating -0.116 ** -0.073   -0.330 * 
New Orleans 0.697 *** 1.105 *** 1.648 *** 


















Figure 2: Proportion Firms Failing, 1871-1880 
 




As with earlier regression analyses, I examine three distinct failure periods: 1871-
1876, 1877-1878, and 1879-1880.  Spells began in 1866, included year-long 
increments, and ended in 1880 (or were dropped from the risk set upon failure).  
“Credit rating” was lagged, so that a firm’s estimated risk of failure depended on the 
rating as measured during the previous year.   
Results suggest that credit-ratings were more effective in predicting failure 
before and after the 1877-1878 period of heightened scrutiny.  During both the earlier 
and later periods, firms were slower to fail if they had a higher credit-rating.  
However, the effect was larger and more significant in the earlier period.   
Discussion 
In the decades following the American Civil War, Dun reluctantly provided 
credit-ratings of firms for customers expanding their trade networks in the growing 
domestic economy.  For a brief period in the 1870s, these ratings were made more 
visible, putting Dun in a position of greater accountability, bearing a greater burden of 
justifying ratings that had been performing poorly throughout the decade.  This 
reaction from Dun professionals offers a unique historical window through which 
symbolic responses to failure by one particular type of organization could be observed.  
The regression analyses included here provide evidence to suggest that, when 
facing heightened accountability, decision-makers may adopt both signaling and 
filtering strategies to avoid unwanted attention.  Ordered logit results show how 
ratings professionals preemptively demonstrate legitimacy through the use of external 
decision-making criteria to assign potentially controversial ratings.  Multinomial 
results show how these professionals manipulate outcomes as well as the means under 
these conditions, minimizing the number of changes to reduce their signature.  




impression management to affect specific audience behaviors associated with routine 
organizational events that are ambiguously negative” (Elsbach et al. 1998:69).   
What makes this evidence of anticipatory signaling and filtering particularly 
meaningful is that Dun professionals are taking steps here to avoid confrontation – 
steps that do not necessarily serve to better predict underlying fitness.  As the 
following analyses begin to show, as Dun professionals react to heightened 





EXAMINATION OF CREDIT LEDGERS  
Content Analysis 
I took multiple steps to examine ledger material, carrying out content analysis 
on reports submitted by local Dun professionals in New Orleans from 1845 to 1880.  
The year 1845 was the earliest year that ledger content was recorded in the original 
records from the firms that I sampled; entries beyond 1880 were often incomplete, due 
to a transition at Dun from calligraphy-style writing to type-written pages, which were 
not among the materials in the Harvard Business School collections.  I first focused on 
determining the kinds of information held on file that might be used directly by 
subscribers.
16
  Here, I constructed measures from information distilled in ratings 
Reference Books (name, assets, trade), as well as information on file for subscriber 
use but not separately published in these ratings volumes.   In order to capture a 
segment of the population that was exposed to relatively homogeneous economic 
conditions, I selected reports on 400 firms from a single industry − the wine and liquor 
trade.  In terms of capturing variation among the reports, examining firms from this 
industry was especially fruitful because this trade had a particularly wide variety of 
firms (size, tenure, etc.).  Dun agents used several kinds of descriptive items to 
characterize a firm and its ownership.  As mentioned, information in these ledger 
records was wide ranging, from specifics about ownership habits and disposition, to 
the longevity of firm, to the ethnicity of the firm’s clientele.  I coded these records to 
track this information, and details were collapsed into simple categories.  To ensure 
the reliability and discriminant validity of my constructs, I relied primarily on the 
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three dimensions (capital, character, capacity) used in prior research (e.g., Oligario 
2006) and subjected them to preliminary analyses to establish their relationship to 
credit ratings that were assigned at the time entries were being made in the ledgers.  
First, estimates of the proprietor’s worth – capital asset levels (basis for “pecuniary 
strength” in the reference books) – were recorded as they appeared in each entry. 
Second, the total number of times a detail related to a proprietor’s character or 
capacity was mentioned was counted in each entry to the ledger. See Table 6 for the 
items listed for each type.   
Such mentions were divided into four categories: lo character (any critical 
character mentions), hi character (extreme praise of character), lo capacity (any 
mentions of capacity shortcomings), and hi capacity (extreme praise of capacity of 
proprietor[s]).
17




 of the language used to describe firms 
and their proprietors, I took stock of the volume and timing of ledger information
20
 so 
that I could connect these trends to key moments in the history of the firm.  Using a 
much larger data set – 2,103 firms from various industries (17,746 ledger entries from 
1845-1880) – data were coded in various ways.  First, for each ledger entry, the name 
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 Extensive examination of reference book items revealed that proprietors described with items 
preceded by “very” or preceded by/followed by “well” (e.g. “stands well”) were treated with relative 
deference.  No such stratification of critical items was evident.   Issues of intercoder reliability are 
important to consider here for future analyses.   As these coding decisions are based on latent rather 
than manifest content, there is enough subjective interpretation here to merit a separate assessment of 
this content (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999). 
18
A regression of 1866-1880 credit ratings on character, capacity, and estimated worth items was 
performed, with results establishing that there was a strong, significant relationship between these 
ledger items and ratings during the post-war period. 
19
 A separate regression was performed with mentions of moderate praise from a limited sample of 
firms.  There was no significant relationship between these items and credit ratings, so to reduce the 
cost of data collection, I did not include these non-superlatives in my analysis of the larger sample. 
20
 Issues of intercoder reliability are important to consider here, as well. However, when coding textual 
artifacts, intercoder reliability is more important for latent, rather than manifest content, due to the 
subjective interpretations coders must make based on their own mental schemata (Potter and Levine-





of the evaluated firm, the firm’s industry, the date of the entry, the length of the entry 
(number lines), and a number identifying the correspondent or reporter in the field 
submitting the information in the entry were recorded.  
 









Building on extent research on the efficacy of communication channels and 
sources (e.g., Tushman 1977; Allen et al. 1980, Gerstenfeld and Berger 1980), I used 
these data to appraise the value of ledger reports used by subscribers at the time Dun 
re-introduced its summary ratings after the Civil War.
21
  At its core, Dun was an 
information processing system (Tushman and Nadler 1978; Daft and Weick 1984).  
Knowledge about a firm and its proprietors – facts, insights, conclusions, empirical 
results – was collected, encoded to become information, and then transferred within 
and across organizations to be used by various users (Thayer 1968; Rogers and 
Agarwala-Rogers 1976).  The value of any information produced by such a system is 
largely a function of whether or not users are willing to apply it (Moenaert and Souder 
1996).  Extant research in MIS asserts that information that is functional – relevant, 
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 As mentioned earlier, the very first set of ratings were introduced before the Civil War.  However, the 
first full Reference Book edition heavily promoted was at this time.  
High 
Character 
Low Character High  
Capacity 
Low Capacity 
Credit in the Trade 
Standing in the Trade 
 
Riskiness of Behavior 
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– Health of Proprietor Low 
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– Information Gathering 
Difficult 






novel, and comprehensible – and comes from a credible source is likely to be used and 
accepted by users (Thayer 1968; Larker and Lessig 2007; Ives et al. 1983; Wilton and 
Meyers 1986).  Information relevance refers to the extent to which information is 
appropriate to the user’s goals and activities, and its novelty refers to the depth of new 
insights revealed in the information (Wilton and Meyers 1986).  Its comprehensibility 
is the ease with which it can be decoded and understood, and credibility is the trust the 
user has in the information provider (Thayer 1968). 
Table 7 provides summary measures from this data, split by period: the earlier 
1845-1864 period and the period following heavily-promoted ratings re-introduction, 
1865-1880. First, the proportion of ledger entries containing certain content items 
(with difference in proportions tests included) was calculated.  In the top left corner of 
the table, the first few rows summarize the financial information recorded in the 
ledgers during each period.  Using the data on Wine and Liquor merchants, I draw 
attention to the proportion of ledger entries providing different levels of specificity.  A 
firm’s estimated worth was listed in the ledgers as either a point estimate, a range of 
values, or not listed at all.  Below these statistics are summaries of subjective 
information provided by Dun professionals on the same 400 merchants, namely the 











              
      Period 1 Period 2     Period to Period Change in Ratings Value 
      1845-65 1866-80     Credibility Novelty Compreh. Relevance 
Proportion $$ specific 0.35 0.63 **           
Proportion $$ range   0.57 0.34 **   (+)     (-) 
Proportion no $$ listed 0.08 0.03 *           
Proportion High Char Listed 0.51 0.56 **     (-)     
Proportion Low Char Listed 0.05 0.07             
Proportion High Capacity Listed 0.14 0.36 **     (-)     
Proportion Low Capacity Listed 0.14 0.18             
Proportion Repeat Reporter 0.65 0.80 *   (+)       
Proportion No Change 0.04 0.06 **     (-)     
Report Frequency (# entries/mo.) 1.82 1.80 0.98 1.07         
               (St. Deviations)         
Months Prior to Transition 10.6 15.2 16.8 27.1 (+)       
Months Prior to Reference Book - 9.9/7.9 12.6 9.1       (-) 
Entry Length (# lines)         (+)       
  All   0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2       (-) 
  Transition 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.4         
  No Transition 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2         
Proportion, by Length Category                 
  1 line or less  0.54 0.42 **           
  2-4 lines   0.41 0.51 **           
  5+ lines   0.05 0.07 *           




Next, using data coded from the larger, 2,103-firm sample, I shift focus away 
from specifics in the ledger entries and calculate summary measures related to Dun’s 
administrative handling of the ledger entries.  First, I list the proportion of entries that 
were provided by “repeat” agents – agents that had reported on the same firm once 
before. The sequence of ledger entries on any given firm was usually based on 
information provided by multiple reporters in the field; it was not uncommon to see a 




  Listed next was the 
proportion of entries in each period with “no change” entered.  When a ledger entry 
was recorded at a time when no new information was available from the field, the 
message “no change” (or, abbreviated, “NC”) was entered in the ledger.   
Then, I listed the frequency of reports per month in each period.  The total 
number of times an entry was added to the ledgers for each firm in each month was 
counted to determine, for each period, how often Dun was reporting on its firms.  
Then, I calculated the gap time between the entries recorded at transitions (above) and 
the most recent entries just prior to these transitions.  Extensive examination of ledger 
entries reveals that Dun reporters in the field took advantage of their proximate 
positions relative to evaluated firms to anticipate these noteworthy events, often 
providing a brief signal
24
 within a year of the events actually happening.  Next, I 
compared ledger entry dates to the exact months that reference books were published.  
I use data from 1866-1867 and then from 1879-1980, in lieu of pre/post-Civil War 
periods (no ratings coded during pre-Civil War period), to show how closely ledger 
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 While past research has suggested that Dun professionals providing reports from the field became 
specialized and focused on certain industries, I found no evidence of this in my own data. 
23
 My data show that the median length of service by reporters in the field was a little 3 years.  The data 
also show that only a small handful of the over 150 reporters in New Orleans were committed full-time 
for 2 or 3 years in a row; the median credit history of a firm tracked in the New Orleans ledgers was 5 
years. 
24
 My data suggests that such anticipation notices were most often quite brief.  Reporters were careful 
to report transitions, not effect transitions with verbose reports that may affect performance.   
 71 
entries precede ratings throughout the decade.  Finally, I calculated the average length 
of each entry (number of lines in the ledger) for each period, which were determined, 
first, for all entries, then for entries recorded at the time of noteworthy events or 
“transitions” in a firm’s history (add/drop partner, industry change, failure,25 address 
change, legal troubles) , and then for all other entries.   To add texture, in the bottom 
left corner, I also provide a breakdown of proportions of ledger entries per period in 
each of three categories of entry length.   
On the right-hand side of the table, I provide a simple appraisal of the 
changing value of Dun’s reports from the 1845-1865 period to the 1866-1880 period.  
I use the left-side summary measures as evidence to suggest either improvement or 
decline along the dimensions of information utility: credibility, novelty, 
comprehensibility, and relevance.  Mentions of asset levels or estimated worth 
became much more precise in the second period.  Given the 18
th
 century business 
community’s growing emphasis on calculability, this shift undoubtedly sent a 
conformity signal to Dun’s audience, improving their source credibility.   However, it 
was common knowledge that the accuracy of financial information provided to Dun 
reporters in the field was very low.  Recorded values in the ledgers were often 
changing, and it did not help a subscriber trying to appraise the riskiness of a firm by 
absorbing the uncertainty of financial data with the exactness of a point estimate.  
Thus, a shift to greater specificity made ledger information less appropriate or 
relevant.   In the second period, I also show that the proportion of entries with 
mentions of high character and high capacity rose.  These mentions represent a greater 
                                                          
25
 These aforementioned events are all measured in earlier logit analyses. 
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number of superlatives written about a firm.  Handing out high praise more freely – a 
greater saturation of ledgers with this language – reduces its novelty.26   
I also take note of changes in timing and length of ledger entries.  In the 
second period, entries get longer, more often include content from a return reporter, 
and more closely precede reference book releases.  One interpretation here is that Dun 
professionals are becoming better equipped to handle subscriber or evaluated firm 
feedback, providing more information from more knowledgeable reporters at the 
times when the reporting process is more likely to stimulate interest in firms under 
review (ratings assignment).  This more anticipatory posture of Dun professionals 
puts them in a better position to defend their ratings while, through their presence, 
acting as a signal of their commitment to their relationship with subscribers (Spence. 
1974; Meyer 1979; Tolbert 1985). Altogether, these changes in administrative 
behavior (having more to say during moments of higher exposure and heightened 
attention) build second-period source credibility.   However, entries do not occur 
more frequently in the second period than in the first, and seem less sensitive to key 
events among firms being evaluated.  Summary measures for second period frequency 
do not change significantly, while those for transition-specific timing and length 
appear to indicate that Dun professionals have less to say in the second period about 
firms during the most meaningful times in the histories of these firms, making their 
information less novel and less relevant.  Overall, summary measures in Table 7 seem 
to indicate that the value of information is increasing during Period 2, as a function of 
a stronger relationship Dun is building with its information users.  Under the surface, 
however, the functional utility of the information in Period 2 seems to be eroding.  
                                                          
26
 A regression of credit ratings on mentions of hi-character for both early and then later years within 
the 1866-1880 frame reveals that the significance and magnitude of the effect of hi-character mentions 
on ratings sharply declines over time.  
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That is, the value of Dun’s ledger record information is improving in form rather than 





Reputations are not just a reflection of a firm’s performance history. Rather, 
the link between reputation and performance is moderated by the amount of attention 
an audience is paying to performance (Rao 1994; Anderson and Shirako 2009).  Past 
research has shown that this link is stronger for certain, more prominent actors (e.g., 
Merton 1968).  I submit here that the link is weaker for actors that tend to blend in.  
The wallflower may not get the best dancer, but will likely save a fractured toe or two 
by avoiding the worst. Following this logic, if a firm can minimize the impact of poor 
performance on its reputation by blending in, it will be most likely to do so in 
situations where the risk of being singled out is greatest.   
In this study, I examine mid-19th century credit reporting and how credit 
reporting professionals addressed their own poor performance. Through an inspection 
of two reporting formats, I provide evidence to suggest that these experts do try to 
blend in by distorting their reports and manipulating their data collection and 
reporting procedures.  Furthermore, this evidence suggests that these reputation-
preservation tactics do appear at moments when they were at risk of being singled out.  
That is, when accountability pressure – the pressure to justify decisions and outcomes 
– was heightened, they tried to mask their poor performance by minimizing their own 
informational signal.  When they needed to disappear most, impression management 
tactics appeared.     
The firm studied here – R.G. Dun and Co. (Dun – successor to the Mercantile 
Agency) was at risk of being singled out at two key moments: (a) at the time of the 
release of the more underperforming of the two aforementioned reporting formats 
(ratings) and (b) at the time of extreme public censure following this release.   
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At these moments when accountability was heightened, Dun tried to blend in the 
following ways:   
1. They avoided making changes to their ratings, and when they did, they leaned 
more heavily on culturally-acceptable evaluation criteria. 
2. They adjusted their data collection and information reporting procedures to 
boost their credibility.   
By blending in, they tried to avoid anticipated audience challenges (e.g., media 
scrutiny, litigation) that threatened to erode market share and legal protection.  In 
doing so, however, they sacrificed the quality of their reporting formats.   
I use the social context of 19th century credit-rating in this study as the empirical 
setting in which I examine how public censure affects failure response, specifically 
risk appraisal.  I examine these trends through the evaluative choices made by agents 
of the most prominent credit ratings firm of the time, R.G. Dun and Co. (now Dun and 
Bradstreet).  This environmental change and the immediate reaction to it by agents at 
Dun represents a unique opportunity to study how sharp changes in the environment 
can affect the behavior and performance of expert organizations – institutional actors 
that provide a central role in the healthy functioning of mediated markets.  
A Final Word on Experts  
Exchange information is often incomplete and costly, creating severe 
information asymmetry problems and exchange inefficiencies (Stiglitz 2000).  
Evaluating firms in markets is a difficult problem for potential trade partners and 
investors, a process often fraught with uncertainty, due to the spatial and social 
distance between interested parties (Stiglitz 1985; Hertzel and Smith 1993). When 
partner or product appraisal becomes overwhelmingly difficult, potential trading 
partners often turn to experts for a helping hand – disinterested third parties such as 
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financial analysts (Zuckerman 1999), professional service firms (Salacuse 2000), and 
cultural critics (Hsu 2006), who produce specialized information and services to firms 
in strategic partner and product evaluation.   
The use of these experts follows from their capacity to adapt more effectively 
to complex, unstructured decision-making environments and their ability to take 
advantage of geographic and experiential proximity to gather and process information 
(Shanteau and Stewart 1992; Spence and Brucks 1997).  As their contribution grows 
and legitimacy is established, these experts often provide a more generalized 
intermediary function, supporting a wider community of stakeholders by creating and 
maintaining the integrity of a high volume of transactions (Vaaler and McNamera 
2004; Langohr and Langhor 2008).  At such a level, knowledge supplied by experts, 
such as analysts trading in equity markets (Kavajecz and Odders-White 2001); experts 
dealing in securities (Bihkchandani and Huang 1993); and credit-rating agents 
assessing the creditworthiness of entrepreneurs, firms, and their products (Carruthers 
and Cohen 2006; Ruef and Patterson 2009), is indispensable to the orderly functioning 
of markets.  
A fundamental assumption inherent in this stakeholder-expert intermediary 
relationship is that the expert will employ its decision-making capabilities in a 
dependable, trustworthy fashion.  That is, agents accepted as legitimate authorities are 
expected to maintain high-caliber decision making and avoid problems of 
carelessness, bias, and inattentiveness.  However, careful research on mediated 
markets reveals accuracy problems and expert evaluations that, at times, fail to reflect 
the underlying quality of firms (Zuckerman 1999, Hsu 2006).  Often, preferences and 
attitudes that expert analysts and agents carry with them adversely affect their 
evaluative ability (e.g., Carruthers and Cohen 2006); also, conflicts of interest are 
thought to compromise the integrity of the expert appraisal process (e.g., Michaely 
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and Womack 1999); and a dedication to ratings stability over accuracy is believed to 
limit the efficacy of evaluations (Watts 2003; Frost 2007).   
Recent examples of such problems come to mind.  In 2003, securities analysts 
on Wall Street were charged in major conflict-of-interest scandals, upsetting the web 
of investment activity supported by sell-side research.  In 2007, the failure of agents at 
for-profit credit-rating agencies to properly assess the riskiness of complex financial 
instruments triggered a major subprime mortgage crisis.  These developments were 
forceful reminders that the services of experts are critical to the healthy functioning of 
mediated markets and coordinated investment activity therein.  Moreover, they served 
as catalysts for public criticism over the shortcomings of market experts.  Media 
scrutiny following these developments has been especially severe in recent years, 
drawing attention to problems that have crept into the appraisal process (e.g., Klein 
2004; Norris 2007; Wayne 2009).   
While observers place varying importance on each of the factors affecting 
accuracy (Partnoy 1999; cf. Senate CRA Oversight Hearings 2006), concern from the 
investor community, business press, and federal government reveals a strong 
preference for overall sustained oversight and control over critical third party 
appraisal processes.  In the wake of recent scandals and financial crises, various 
formal measures have been adopted or proposed to keep experts in check − motivating 
quality decision making and dampening the risk of carelessness, bias, and 
inattentiveness through the punitive cost of non-compliance.  Performance and 
procedural compliance initiatives such as portions of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 promise effective regulation of third party financial analysts and rating 
agents.  Research suggests, however, that the effectiveness of informal control often 
rivals, even exceeds, such formal means of regulation (Benabou and Laroque 1992).  
Nevertheless, there is still much to learn regarding the effects of reputation on expert 
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decision-making.  How do experts react to intense public scrutiny?  That is, how do 
organizations react to evident failures in decision-making processes, and how does the 
public nature of this failure shape the nature of the response?  In the current study, I 
show how accountability pressure may actually produce unwanted latent effects – 
ratings distortion that ultimately should provide a word of caution regarding public 
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